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Introduction
Traditionally, an important tool in public policy analysis has been the principle of
revealed preferences. Under the assumption that people choose optimally, the policy maker
can infer what people want by observing their choices. Recent developments in behavioral
economics have questioned this approach. In particular, if people are boundedly rational,
policy makers can no longer rely on observed choices alone. Rather, the effectiveness of
policy measures could be improved by taking into account that a substantial part of the
population exhibits non-standard decision making patterns (Bernheim and Rangel 2007,
Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2004). Therefore, a new field of behavioral public
economics has set out to identify domains in which incorporating insights from behavioral
economics can improve policy making.
This dissertation aims at the identification of systematic behavioral biases that are
relevant in the context of economic policy. In total, the dissertation consists of four
chapters. In each chapter, we empirically analyze in a specific environment how individuals
make economic decisions. We find in all chapters that, on average, human behavior is
neither perfectly rational, nor completely random. On the one hand, there is always
a relatively large share of people behaving in line with standard economic theory. On
the other hand, we find in all our settings that a substantial share of people deviates
from the predictions of standard theory. Most importantly, we find that deviations from
the standard model are systematic. In all four chapters, a large share of people acts in
accordance with behavioral theories that are well-known from the literature on bounded
rationality and from cognitive psychology. Our empirical approach allows us to categorize
the different types of behavior in the data. Taken together, the chapters in this dissertation
provide an insight into behavioral patterns of decision-making in a number of economic
domains. The findings often have straightforward implications for the design of public
policy, as will be discussed in the respective chapters.
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 share the same methodology: in both chapters we analyze
a data set with roughly 1,000 observations that is representative for the adult population
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living in Germany.1 This approach allows us to elicit measures of the pervasiveness of cer-
tain cognitive biases in the population. As many economic decisions involve a substantial
amount of uncertainty, it is crucial for economists to understand how people process prob-
abilistic information. In Chapter 1, we address people’s ability to form simple probability
judgments. Our results show that almost a third of the respondents exhibits a cognitive
bias. In particular, the biases we find are consistent either with the gambler’s fallacy or
with the hot hand fallacy. We find that in the setting under investigation the gambler’s
fallacy is more than twice as frequent as the hot hand fallacy. In a second step, we relate
the observed biases to economic outcomes in two domains where they are likely to play
an important role: job search and financial decision making. Our results show that the
observed deviations from the standard model have a negative impact on individual eco-
nomic outcomes in both domains. In the labor market, we find that people who exhibit
the hot hand fallacy are significantly more likely to be long-term unemployed. In contrast,
in financial decision making, people who are prone to the gambler’s fallacy have a signifi-
cantly higher probability to overdraw their bank account. These findings suggest that it is
not biased probability judgment per se that determines economic outcomes. Rather, the
specific form of a person’s bias plays a decisive role, depending on the context in which
economic decisions are made. Our findings have straightforward policy implications for
the labor market and for debt counseling services.
Chapter 2 investigates the prevalence and determinants of probabilistic judgment bi-
ases in settings where subjects face conditional probabilities. In economic theory, the
benchmark solution process for these environments is Bayes’ rule. However, research in
cognitive psychology has shown that people often have difficulties to solve conditional
probability problems. In particular, biases such as base rate neglect have been widely
documented in the literature (Tversky and Kahneman 1982). Our data set allows us to
shed more light on the actual prevalence of base rate neglect in the general population.
While we find that base rate neglect is rather prominent in the data, the share of people
exhibiting this bias is by far lower than in previous studies with non-representative sub-
ject pools. Moreover, our data allows us to analyze the determinants of base rate neglect.
Surprisingly, we find that both higher education and higher cognitive ability increase the
probability that a person exhibits base rate neglect. This finding can also serve as an
explanation for why our results regarding the prevalence of base rate neglect differ sharply
1These two chapters are based on joint work with Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and
Uwe Sunde.
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from non-representative subject pools: previous studies have been conducted mostly with
university students and with medical professionals, i.e., with highly educated individuals.
Chapter 3 addresses the question whether people take the central principle of fun-
gibility into account when making consumption decisions.2 Recall that fungibility is an
economic notion that implies that any unit of money is substitutable for another. If fun-
gibility holds, the most important determinant for consumption should be a consumer’s
total wealth, whereas the specific composition of wealth should be irrelevant. We find
in an incentivized laboratory experiment that many subjects do not treat money as fun-
gible. Subjects are influenced by a label attached to a part of their budget and they
change consumption in line with the suggestion of the label. Moreover, subjects with
lower mathematical ability are more likely to ignore fungibility. A vignette survey con-
firms the external validity of our results. The findings lend support to behavioral models
such as narrow bracketing and mental accounting. One implication of our results is that
in-kind benefits distort consumption more than usually assumed.
In Chapter 4, we investigate the impact of monetary incentives on public-spirited be-
havior.3 We analyze a survey in which volunteer workers are offered financial payments
for their work and we elicit their labor supply reaction to these payments. The unique
structure of the data set allows us to take into account the degree to which workers are mo-
tivated by extrinsic and intrinsic factors. We find that the impact of financial payments on
labor supply depends crucially on the behavioral motives of the volunteers. Whereas high
degrees of intrinsic motivation correspond to a low responsiveness to financial incentives,
high degrees of extrinsic motivation are related to a significant increase in volunteers’ labor
supply when monetary rewards are introduced. Moreover, we find that the prevalence of
crowding-out is rather low. Thus, offering financial incentives leads to a disproportionate
crowding-in of extrinsically motivated workers.
2This chapter is based on joint work with Johannes Abeler and has been circulated as IZA discussion
paper, see Abeler and Marklein (2008).
3This chapter is based on joint work with Armin Falk, Annette Meier, and Martin Schellhorn.

CHAPTER 1
Economic Consequences of Biased Probability Judgment:
Representative Evidence
1.1. Introduction
Economic decisions often involve a significant amount of uncertainty. A thorough un-
derstanding of economic decision making is therefore only possible by investigating how
people actually form probability judgments. Economic theory typically assumes decisions
to be consistent with the basic laws of probability theory. In contrast, a large number of
experimental studies has shown that humans frequently make mistakes in processing prob-
abilistic information.1 Despite the vast experimental evidence, three important questions
have received little attention so far: first, do the cognitive biases we observe in laboratory
subject pools also exist in the general population? Second, what are the determinants of
biased probability judgment? And third, which impact do probability judgment biases
have on economic decision making?
In this chapter we take a novel approach to the analysis of decision making under
uncertainty by directly measuring the capability for probability judgment in a represen-
tative sample of more than 1,000 individuals. This procedure allows us to evaluate the
pervasiveness of cognitive biases in the general population. In a second step, we study the
determinants of biased probability judgment, with a particular focus on respondents’ edu-
cation level and cognitive ability. Finally, we evaluate the impact that biased probability
judgment has on individual economic outcomes.
Respondents’ abilities in probabilistic reasoning are elicited via a survey question that
addresses a fundamental bias in probability judgment: the so-called gambler’s fallacy.
People who exhibit this bias expect random processes to have self-correcting properties,
which is in direct contradiction to the principle of independence between random out-
comes. The gambler’s fallacy has been widely discussed in the literature, starting with a
famous essay by Laplace (1820). In the chapter “Concerning Illusions in the Estimation
of Probabilities”, Laplace states:
1See for example Tversky and Kahneman (1971), Grether (1980), Charness and Levin (2005). A
comprehensive overview is given by Conlisk (1996).
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When a number in the lottery of France has not been drawn for a long time, the
crowd is eager to cover it with stakes. They judge since the number has not been
drawn for a long time that it ought at the next drawing to be drawn in preference to
others. So common an error appears to me to rest upon an illusion by which one is
carried back involuntarily to the origin of events. It is, for example, very improbable
that at the play of heads and tails one will throw heads ten times in succession. This
improbability which strikes us indeed when it has happened nine times, leads us to
believe that at the tenth throw tails will be thrown.
We designed our probability task such that respondents were confronted with the following
series of eight tosses of a fair coin: tails - tails - tails - heads - tails - heads - heads - heads.
Respondents then had to indicate the probability with which tails occurs in the next
toss of the coin. The correct answer is 50%, as the coin tosses are independent of each
other. Since the sequence ends with a streak of three heads, the gambler’s fallacy would
lead respondents to predict that tails comes up with a probability of more than 50%.
The opposite bias, the so-called hot hand fallacy, would lead respondents to indicate a
probability of less than 50%. The term hot hand derives from basketball, where players
who make a shot are often believed to be more likely to hit the next shot, in contrast to
players who miss a shot (see for example Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky 1985). In our
setting, the hot hand fallacy implies the belief that the streak of heads at the end of the
sequence is likely to be continued.
The probability task was administered to a sample of more than 1,000 individuals,
representative of the German population. Results show that 60.4% of the respondents
give the correct answer. Thus, a majority of the respondents is aware of the independence
between random outcomes. Among the incorrect answers, the gambler’s fallacy is by far
the most frequent bias: 21.1% of the respondents overestimate the probability for tails.
In contrast, 8.8% answer in line with the hot hand fallacy, as they underestimate this
probability. The answer “I don’t know” is given by 9.6% of the sample. Our findings
have two important implications: first, a substantial share of the population seems to lack
basic knowledge about stochastic processes. Second, the biases we observe are systematic,
as deviations from the normative solution are not distributed randomly. Rather, among
people who make a mistake, the gambler’s fallacy is the predominant bias.
In order to address the determinants of biased probability judgment, the survey elicited
a number of background variables such as education, age, and gender. Our empirical anal-
ysis shows that more educated people are much more likely to answer correctly. Moreover,
we find a gender effect, with women being less likely to give the correct answer. A unique
feature of the data set is that it includes two measures of respondents’ cognitive ability
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that are very similar to measures from a widely used IQ-test. One measure is used as a
proxy for general knowledge (also known as crystallized intelligence), whereas the other
is a proxy for the speed of cognitive perception (also known as fluid intelligence).2 These
measures relate to respondents’ answers in plausible ways: whereas the measure for general
knowledge is positively correlated with answers to the probability question, the measure
for perceptual speed has no explanatory power.3 This finding is consistent with the view
that a correct perception of the independence between random outcomes relies mainly on
acquired knowledge, not on respondents’ mechanical cognitive functions.
As uncertainty is a crucial factor in many economic decisions, one would expect that
biased probability judgment has a detrimental effect on individual economic outcomes.
The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy are likely to affect economic decision
making in domains where people base their decisions on a sequence of realizations of a
random process. In particular, these two biases should matter in situations where a streak
of similar outcomes has occurred prior to the decision. Our data contain information
about behavior in two domains where the specific form of judgment biases studied in this
chapter is highly relevant: job search decisions by an unemployed person and consumption
decisions by a cash-constrained consumer.
In the domain of job search, assume that a job-seeker who has received feedback on
a number of applications has to decide whether to continue looking for a job. In this
context, the employers’ reactions can be interpreted as realizations of a random process:
a job offer is a positive realization, whereas a rejection is a negative realization. As a
thought experiment, consider the specific situation in which the job-seeker has received
several rejections in a row. The hot hand fallacy then predicts that he is going to believe
that this streak is likely to continue. As a result, he might stop searching for a job
altogether and stay unemployed for a long time. Put differently, the hot hand fallacy
can lead to persistent unemployment by exerting a negative influence on the job-seeker’s
perception of his job finding probability. In contrast, a job-seeker who is prone to the
gambler’s fallacy will continue his job search, out of the belief that a streak of rejections
has made it more likely to receive a job offer in the future. As a consequence, persistence
of unemployment should be less severe among job-seekers who are prone to the gambler’s
fallacy.
2See also the seminal contribution by Cattell (1963).
3In a related paper, Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2008) find in a web-based experiment among
university students that higher cognitive ability is associated with lower incidences of biased judgment.
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In the empirical analysis, we find indeed that being prone to the hot hand fallacy is
significantly related to long-term unemployment. Probit estimates indicate that exhibiting
the hot hand fallacy is associated with a 6.1%-point increase in the probability of being
long-term unemployed, controlling for background characteristics such as age, gender,
years of schooling, and household wealth. This effect is relatively large compared to the
share of long-term unemployed persons in the total sample of 6.8%. Additional support
for our predictions comes from the finding that the gambler’s fallacy, in turn, does not
lead to a significantly higher risk of being long-term unemployed.
Another domain where a sequence of previously observed realizations might influence
economic behavior is in the domain of consumption. As a thought experiment, assume that
a cash-constrained consumer has to decide whether to overdraw his bank account in order
to make a large purchase. In this context, the relevant series of random outcomes observed
by the decision maker consists of personal income shocks that can be either negative or
positive. Consider a situation in which the consumer experienced several negative income
shocks in a row. Being prone to the gambler’s fallacy predicts that he will be inclined
to overdraw his bank account for short-term consumption, as he believes that a positive
income shock is “due” in the near future. In contrast, the hot hand fallacy implies that
the consumer will refrain from consumption and the bank account will not be overdrawn.
The regression results show that financial behavior is indeed related to people’s ability
to form probability judgments. We confirm our hypothesis that people who exhibit the
gambler’s fallacy are significantly more likely to overdraw their bank account. The effects
are substantial: according to our probit estimates, being prone to the gambler’s fallacy
increases a person’s probability for having an overdrawn bank account by 8.8%-points,
while the share of people with an overdrawn bank account in the total sample is 16.6%.
Our predictions are further supported by the finding that being prone to the hot hand
fallacy does not increase the risk of having an overdrawn bank account.
Of course, one has to be very careful in interpreting the empirical findings of our anal-
ysis. Economic decisions in the domains of job search and consumption are highly complex
and are influenced by many different factors. For instance, the institutions in which a de-
cision takes place as well as a job-seeker’s specific skills and preferences might have a large
influence on success in the labor market. Still, on top of these factors, our findings allow
us to speculate about a direct link between people’s perception of probabilities and their
actual economic decisions. The fact that the hot hand fallacy is important in job search
decisions, whereas the gambler’s fallacy is important in financial decisions suggests that
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it is not biased probability judgment per se that determines economic outcomes. Rather,
the specific form of a person’s bias plays a decisive role, depending on the context in which
economic decisions are made.
Our study offers an important methodological contribution, as the representative de-
sign of the sample allows us to draw conclusions about cognitive biases in the general
population.4 Several studies have argued that the effectiveness of policy measures could
be improved by taking into account that a substantial part of the population exhibits non-
standard decision making patterns (Bernheim and Rangel 2007, Bertrand, Mullainathan,
and Shafir 2004). As a first step in this direction, the methodology employed in this
chapter can inform policy makers about the actual prevalence of probability judgment
biases and about the way in which these biases affect economic outcomes. From an ap-
plied perspective, our findings have straightforward implications for the design of policy
measures on the labor market and in the domain of household debt counseling. We derive
simple measures of debiasing that are in line with “libertarian paternalism”, an approach
that helps boundedly rational agents to make better decisions, without limiting the free-
dom of agents who decide optimally in the first place (Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein,
O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003, Thaler and Sunstein 2003).
In the related literature, Rabin (2002) has shown from a theoretical perspective that
the gambler’s fallacy can be interpreted as people’s tendency to exaggerate the degree to
which a small sample reflects the properties of the underlying data generating process. In
the empirical literature, a number of studies has used field data to investigate probability
judgment biases. Clotfelter and Cook (1993) demonstrate that lottery players act in
line with the gambler’s fallacy: evidence from the Maryland state lottery shows that
in the days after a winning number has been drawn, betting on this particular number
drops significantly. Croson and Sundali (2005) investigate the betting behavior of roulette
players in a casino in Reno, Nevada. They find that a long streak of the same outcome
leads players to bet disproportionately on the opposite outcome. E.g., a streak of 5 times
red in a row leads to significantly more bets on black. Terrell (1994) investigates field data
from horse races and finds that betting behavior is consistent with the gambler’s fallacy.
Note that all these studies rely on aggregate data, as for instance the total number of
bets placed on a particular number. In contrast, an important feature of our analysis is
that we elicit individual data about respondents’ perception of probabilities. Moreover,
4For instance, Hogarth (2005) argues in favor of a more representative design of empirical research in
economics and a more careful assessment of the circumstances under which evidence from experiments can
be generalized to the population at large.
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our data set contains information about respondents’ educational background, cognitive
ability, and individual economic outcomes. Closely related to our analysis is a study by
Stango and Zinman (2007) who show that cognitive biases can have an impact on financial
decision making. The authors use U.S. data to investigate the so called payment/interest
bias: consumers systematically underestimate the interest rate associated with a given loan
principal and a repayment stream. Their empirical analysis shows that, for loans from
non-bank finance companies, biased consumers do indeed hold loans with significantly
higher interest rates.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 contains a description
of the data. Section 1.3 presents evidence on the pervasiveness of cognitive biases in
the population and addresses the determinants of these biases. The impact of biased
probability judgment on economic outcomes is explored in Section 1.4, and Section 1.5
concludes.
1.2. Data
The data set under investigation consists of 1,012 observations and is a representa-
tive sample of the population living in Germany aged 16 years and older. The data
were collected by the professional interview group TNS Infratest in June and July 2005.
Households were contacted by interviewers according to the Random Route Method (see
Fowler 2002) and one person per household was surveyed.5 All interviewers used the
CAPI procedure (Computer Assisted Personal Interview), administering questions and
collecting answers with the help of a notebook computer. To elicit respondents’ ability for
probability judgment, we used the following question (translated from German):6
Imagine you are tossing a fair coin. After eight tosses you observe the following
result: tails - tails - tails - heads - tails - heads - heads - heads. What is the
probability, in percent, that the next toss is “tails”?
We chose the sequence of outcomes such that the overall occurrence of tails in the sample
is indeed 50% (4 out of 8), to avoid raising doubts among the respondents about the coin
5See Appendix A for a full overview of the original survey (in German).
6The exact wording was: “Nehmen Sie an, Sie werfen eine Mu¨nze, die gleichma¨ßig auf die eine oder
die andere Seite fa¨llt. Nach acht Wu¨rfen beobachten Sie folgendes Ergebnis: Zahl - Zahl - Zahl - Kopf -
Zahl - Kopf - Kopf - Kopf. Wie hoch ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, ausgedru¨ckt in Prozent, dass der na¨chste
Wurf ‘Zahl’ ist?”.
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Table 1.1: Sample Statistics
Variable average std. dev. num. obs.
1 if female 0.537 (0.499) 1,012
Age 47.555 (18.371) 1,011
Years of schooling 10.328 (1.829) 965
Perceptual speed test (raw data) 28.339 (9.853) 902
Perceptual speed test (standardized) 0 (1) 902
Word fluency test (raw data) 22.892 (10.933) 849
Word fluency test (standardized) 0 (1) 849
Log net household income (per month) 7.521 (0.635) 940
Log net household wealth 7.177 (5.421) 772
1 if unemployed 0.114 (0.318) 1012
1 if long-term unemployed 0.068 (0.252) 1012
Account overdrawn 1.504 (0.885) 943
1 if account overdrawn at time of interview 0.166 (0.372) 1012
Table 1.1: Sample Statistics.
being fair. Respondents had to answer with a number between 0% and 100%. Alterna-
tively, they had the possibility to answer “I don’t know”. The correct answer is 50%, as
the coin is fair and the tosses are independent of each other.
In order to address the determinants of biased probability judgment, the data contain a
number of socioeconomic background variables such as education, age, gender, income, and
wealth. A novel feature of the survey is that it elicited measures of respondents’ cognitive
ability. The design of these measures is based on the two-component theory of cognitive
ability, originating from research in developmental psychology (Lang 2005). According to
this theory, cognitive ability can be broadly divided into cognitive mechanics and cognitive
pragmatics (Baltes, Lindenberger, and Staudinger 2006, Lindenberger and Baltes 1997).
The mechanics of cognition (fluid intelligence) reflect fundamental organizational proper-
ties of the central nervous system (Singer 1995). In contrast, the cognitive pragmatics
(crystallized intelligence) reflect the knowledge-based domain of cognitive ability. Exam-
ples for the mechanics of cognition are the speed, the accuracy, and the coordination of
cognitive processing operations. Examples for the pragmatics are reading and writing
skills, educational qualifications, and professional skills.
Respondents’ performance in the domain of cognitive mechanics was assessed via a
digit-symbol test that has been designed to measure perceptual speed. For this test,
respondents had to match the correct digit to symbols on the computer screen. They had
to match as many digit-symbol pairs as possible within a time frame of 90 seconds. The
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Figure 1.1: Measures of Cognitive Ability. Left panel: Perceptual speed test, measuring
fluid intelligence. Respondents had to match as many digits and symbols as possible in 90 seconds
of time. Right panel: Word fluency test, measuring crystallized intelligence. Respondents had to
name as many distinct animals as possible in 90 seconds of time. Both measures are standardized.
CAPI method allowed us to measure performance directly, registering decisions through
a software that was running in the background. In the area of cognitive pragmatics, a
word fluency test was used to elicit a measure of respondents’ general knowledge. The test
asked participants to name as many distinct animals as possible in 90 seconds of time.
Regarding the impact of biased probability judgment on economic behavior, our re-
search question leads us to focus on two specific domains: respondents’ employment status
and respondents’ financial situation. With respect to employment status, the data contain
information on whether respondents are registered as unemployed. Moreover, respondents
have to indicate whether they are long-term unemployed, i.e., unemployed for 12 months
and longer. To address respondents’ financial situation, they are asked about the number
of days (per year) their bank account is overdrawn, and whether their account is currently
overdrawn at the time of the interview.
Sample statistics are shown in Table 1.1. About 53.7% of the sample are female,
average age is 47.6 years, and respondents have on average 10.3 years of schooling. The
measures for cognitive ability have a mean value of 28.3 (perceptual speed test) and
22.9 (word fluency test). For the empirical analysis, both cognitive ability measures are
standardized to have variance one and mean zero. Histograms of the two standardized
measures are presented in Figure 1.1. Note that the shape of both distributions resembles
a normal distribution. With regard to the economic outcome variables, 11.4% of the
respondents are unemployed, and 16.6% indicate that their bank account is overdrawn at
the time of the interview.
1.3. PERVASIVENESS AND DETERMINANTS OF BIASED PROBABILITY JUDGMENT 13
1.3. Pervasiveness and Determinants of Biased Probability Judgment
In this section we document the pervasiveness of cognitive biases in a representative
sample of the German population. We then proceed to address the determinants of biased
probability judgment. Responses to the probability question are shown in the histogram
in Figure 1.2. We find that 60.4% of the survey participants gave the correct answer of
50%. Thus, a majority of the respondents knows that the toss of a coin does not depend
on outcomes of previous tosses. The remaining 39.6% seem to lack a basic understanding
of probability theory. As can be seen from the histogram, the incorrect answers are spread
out over the full range of the answer space, from 1% to 100%. The average estimate for
tails to come up in the next coin toss is a probability of 54.2%. Recall that, as the sequence
in our setting ends with a streak of three heads, the gambler’s fallacy leads respondents to
an estimate of more than 50%. In contrast, the hot hand fallacy implies an estimate of less
than 50%. We find that the gambler’s fallacy is exhibited by 21.1% of the respondents,
whereas 8.8% of the respondents are prone to the hot hand fallacy. The answer “I don’t
know” is given by 9.6% of the respondents.
The fact that the gambler’s fallacy is by far more pervasive than the hot hand fal-
lacy indicates that respondents display systematic biases. This relates our results to an
important debate in economics and in cognitive psychology (see Conlisk 1996, Stanovich
and West 2000). According to one side of this debate, observing non-normative answers
does not prove that people are boundedly rational. Theoretically, mistakes could be ob-
served even if respondents were fully rational, e.g., due to lack of concentration or due
to lack of motivation. However, one would expect such mistakes to be random noise,
without a systematic pattern. If the mistakes in our sample were indeed random noise,
the share of people who exhibit the gambler’s fallacy and the share of people who exhibit
the hot hand fallacy should be of approximately equal size. This is clearly not the case,
as the gambler’s fallacy is more than twice as frequent as the hot hand fallacy. More-
over, a Shapiro-Wilkinson Test rejects the null hypothesis of a Gaussian distribution of
the deviations from the normatively correct answer at any conventional significance level
(p < 0.001). Therefore, our findings indicate that the pattern of non-normative answers
is systematic.
An explanation for the fact that the gambler’s fallacy is the dominant bias in our
setting is suggested in the work by Ayton and Fischer (2004). In their study, subjects were
presented with sequences of binary outcomes that had either a high rate of alternations,
or a high rate of streaks. Subjects then had to guess whether a given sequence was derived
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Figure 1.2: Probability Judgment. The normatively correct solution is a probability of tails
of 50%. The 95 observations for the answer “I don’t know” are not shown.
from human performance (e.g., hits and misses of a professional basketball player during a
game), or from an inanimate chance process (e.g., heads and tails in the successive tosses of
a fair coin). Their study demonstrates that subjects were more likely to attribute sequences
with many streaks to human skilled performance. In contrast, sequences with high rates of
alternation were attributed to inanimate chance processes. Our results are complementary
to these findings, as we show that people who make predictions regarding the outcome of
an inanimate chance process tend to overestimate the occurrence of alternations, whereas
the belief in streaks is relatively infrequent.
Regarding the determinants of biased probability judgment, several basic insights be-
come already apparent from the descriptive statistics. Table 1.2 provides a look at par-
ticipants’ answers, stratified by education, age, and gender. With respect to high school
education, we see that people with more than 10 years of schooling have a relatively high
propensity to answer correctly (72.6% vs. 54.5% of people with 10 years of schooling or
less). Moreover, people with more than 10 years of schooling are very unlikely to either
commit the hot hand fallacy (4.6%) or to answer “I don’t know” (4.3%). Still, they fre-
quently exhibit the gambler’s fallacy: 18.5% of them estimate the probability of tails in
the next toss to be higher than 50%. This finding suggests that the gambler’s fallacy is
prevalent even among highly educated individuals.
Looking at the control variables, we find that gender is an important factor: 65.6% of
men give the correct answer, whereas only 56.0% of women do so. In particular, women
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Table 1.2: Probability Judgment - Descriptive Statistics
Hot Correct Gambler’s Don’t Total
hand answer fallacy know sample
All 87 (8.8%) 596 (60.4%) 208 (21.1%) 95 (9.6%) 986 (100%)
Years of schooling > 10 15 (4.6%) 236 (72.6%) 60 (18.5%) 14 (4.3%) 325 (100%)
Years of schooling ≤ 10 72 (10.9%) 360 (54.5%) 148 (22.4%) 81 (12.3%) 661 (100%)
Female 51 (9.6%) 296 (56.0%) 119 (22.5%) 63 (11.9%) 529 (100%)
Male 36 (7.9%) 300 (65.6%) 89 (19.5%) 32 (7.0%) 457 (100%)
Age < 50 45 (8.1%) 349 (63.1%) 134 (24.2%) 25 (4.5%) 553 (100%)
Age ≥ 50 42 (9.7%) 247 (57.0%) 74 (17.1%) 70 (16.2%) 433 (100%)
Table 1.2: Probability Judgment - Descriptive Statistics. “Hot hand” refers to answers
in the interval [0%,50%), “Correct answer” refers to answers equal to 50%, and “Gambler’s
fallacy” refers to answers in (50%,100%].
are much more likely to answer “I don’t know”. Younger people (below 50 years of age)
are more likely to give the correct answer, but they are also more likely to commit the
gambler’s fallacy. Older people are much more likely to answer “I don’t know” (16.2% vs.
4.5%).
In the following regression analysis we test whether these determinants are statistically
significant and robust to controlling for background characteristics. Table 1.3 presents
probit estimates with the dependent variable being equal to 1 if a respondent gives the
correct answer of 50%.7 It turns out that the effect of schooling is large and significant: an
additional year of schooling is related to a 4%-point increase in the probability of giving
the correct answer (p < 0.01), controlling for cognitive ability. As the baseline of correct
answers in the total sample is 60.4%, this effect is quite sizeable. For the cognitive ability
measures, we see that the coefficient for the word fluency measure is large and significant,
whereas the coefficient for the perceptual speed measure is small and insignificant. These
results suggest that the cognitive pragmatics (general knowledge) have a decisive impact
on giving the correct answer, whereas mechanical cognitive ability (perceptual speed, quick
comprehension) is not relevant to answering the question at hand. As the task does not
allude to computational skills but is rather testing knowledge that is part of the general
7For simplicity, answering “I don’t know” is categorized as a wrong answer in these regressions. If we
exclude these observations from the analysis (i.e., categorize them as missing), the results are very similar.
The coefficients for gender and years of schooling remain highly significant, only the word fluency measure
turns out to be insignificant.
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Table 1.3: Probability Judgment - Determinants (I)
Dependent variable: =1 if answer is 50%, =0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Word fluency 0.044** 0.039**
measure [0.017] [0.018]
Perceptual speed 0.003 -0.010
measure [0.019] [0.020]
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
1 if female -0.090*** -0.092*** -0.084** -0.090***
[0.033] [0.035] [0.032] [0.033]
Years of 0.042*** 0.046***
schooling [0.010] [0.010]
N. Obs. 842 801 892 847
Prob > χ2 0.001 0.000 0.016 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.032 0.009 0.028
Table 1.3: Probability Judgment - Determinants (I). Probit estimates, marginal effects
evaluated at the mean with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy
indicating whether a respondent gave the correct answer (“50%”). Observations with the answer
“I don’t know” are included as incorrect. Cognitive ability measures are standardized.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
education, this is a plausible finding. Regarding the control variables, we find a significant
gender effect that persists even if we include age, cognitive ability and years of schooling
in the regression. According to the estimates, the probability of giving the correct answer
is about 9%-points lower for women (p < 0.01).8
To address the interplay between the nature of participants’ cognitive biases and their
background characteristics in more detail, we estimate a multinomial logit model (Table
1.4). This regression method allows us to determine whether the differences between the
separate answer categories are statistically significant. The dependent variable indicates
in which of the four categories a respondents’ answer is located: either it is correct, or it
is consistent with either the gambler’s fallacy or the hot hand fallacy, or the respondent
8A similar gender effect has been shown by Charness and Levin (2005), who conducted a laboratory
experiment to test under which circumstances individual behavior in a probabilistic decision making task
is consistent with standard economic theory. Our data allows us to show in a representative sample that
the gender effect persists when we control for background characteristics.
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Table 1.4: Probability Judgment - Determinants (II)
Dependent variable: =1 if 50%, =2 if GF, =3 if HH, =4 if Don’t know
(1) (2)
Gambler’s Hot Don’t Gambler’s Hot Don’t
fallacy hand know fallacy hand know
Word fluency -0.058 -0.112 -0.638***
measure [0.094] [0.137] [0.169]
Perceptual speed 0.145 -0.154 -0.049
measure [0.106] [0.143] [0.180]
Years of -0.122** -0.287*** -0.224*** -0.145*** -0.296*** -0.272***
schooling [0.053] [0.080] [0.087] [0.051] [0.076] [0.095]
Age -0.012** -0.004 0.035*** -0.004 -0.003 0.035***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.010]
1 if female 0.341* 0.320 0.637** 0.293* 0.388 0.748**
[0.183] [0.258] [0.282] [0.174] [0.246] [0.303]
Constant 0.547 1.018 -2.139** 0.471 1.026 -1.795
[0.651] [0.922] [1.068] [0.625] [0.880] [1.176]
N. Obs. 801 847
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.040
Table 1.4: Probability Judgment - Determinants (II). Multinomial logit estimates,
standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable =1 if correct answer (“50%”), =2 if gambler’s
fallacy (> 50%), =3 if hot hand fallacy (< 50%), and =4 if “don’t know”. The reference category
is the correct answer. Cognitive ability measures are standardized to have mean 0 and standard
deviation 1. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and *, respectively.
answered “I don’t know”. In the estimations, the reference group consists of those respon-
dents who answered the probability question correctly. This allows us to analyze which
factors determine whether a respondent exhibits a particular bias. The estimates confirm
our earlier descriptive analysis. For instance, the effect of years of schooling is highly
significant: schooling reduces the probability of making a mistake. This finding holds for
each of the three possible mistakes, be it the hot hand fallacy, the gambler’s fallacy, or the
answer “I don’t know”. Remarkably, the effect of schooling is quite asymmetric: Whereas
more schooling protects people from committing the hot hand fallacy (coefficient -0.287,
p < 0.01), its impact on averting the gambler’s fallacy is considerably weaker (coefficient
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-0.122, p = 0.02). This is in line with the descriptive evidence which showed that the
gambler’s fallacy is quite common among highly educated individuals, whereas the hot
hand fallacy is mostly confined to respondents with 10 years of schooling or less. With
regard to the control variables, we find that women and older people are significantly more
likely to answer “I don’t know”.
Taken together, our findings regarding the determinants of biased probability judgment
all point in the same direction: more schooling increases the likelihood that a respondent
gives the correct answer in the probability task. From a policy perspective, it is important
to stress that we find the positive effect of schooling to be a direct effect. A competing
hypothesis would be that schooling has only an indirect effect. For instance, one could
presume that the only determinant of probability judgment is cognitive ability, which
also affects the amount of schooling a given person obtains. To avoid this confound, we
controlled in all regressions for cognitive ability by including measures of respondents’
word fluency and perceptual speed. As the coefficient on years of schooling remains highly
significant, the estimates suggest that schooling directly affects people’s capability for
probability judgment.
1.4. Economic Consequences of Biased Probability Judgment
Uncertainty is a crucial factor in many economic decisions. One would therefore expect
that biased probability judgment can have a detrimental effect on individual economic out-
comes. We propose two domains in which decisions are of a nature that closely resembles
the structure of our probability judgment task: job search decisions by an unemployed
person and consumption decisions by a cash-constrained consumer. In the following, we
first develop the predictions of how the gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy affect
decision making in these domains. In a second step we take our hypotheses to the data.
1.4.1. Behavioral Predictions. The biases that are in the focus of this chapter are
likely to affect economic decision making in domains where agents base their decisions
on a sequence of realizations of a random process. A straightforward translation of this
environment can be found in the domain of job search. As a thought experiment, assume
that a person is looking for a job and sends out a number of applications. The relevant
sequence of random outcomes consists then of the reactions that the job seeker receives on
his applications: they can be either negative (a rejection) or positive (a job offer). After
observing the realization of a sequence of outcomes, the job seeker has to decide whether
to continue his search for a job or not.
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Of course, many factors can play a role in the job finding process. For instance,
the institutional environment, the particular skills of a job-seeker, as well as his previous
work experience might have a large influence on success in the labor market. Still, our
approach allows us to speculate about an additional influence that might play a role on
top of these factors: the impact of a job-seeker’s perception of probabilities on actual job
search behavior. Given the nature of the cognitive biases we investigate, we are interested
mainly in situations where a streak of similar outcomes has occurred prior to the decision.
Consider the case in which a job seeker has received a streak of rejections. Then, the two
probability judgment biases, gambler’s fallacy and hot hand fallacy, lead to the following
predictions: a person who is prone to the gambler’s fallacy will believe that the streak of
rejections is going to end, which implies that a job offer has now become more likely. As a
consequence, he will be encouraged to continue his search for a job. In contrast, a person
who is prone to the hot hand fallacy is going to believe that the streak of rejections is
likely to continue. Given this belief, the worker will become discouraged and may give up
his search for a job altogether.9 We therefore predict that job-seekers who are prone to
the gambler’s fallacy face a high probability of leaving unemployment. In contrast, the
hot hand fallacy can lead to prolongued unemployment by biasing the job-seeker’s beliefs
about his job finding probability such that they become too pessimistic.10 Note that, due
to the need for a streak of rejections to occur, our prediction is unlikely to affect persons
who just became unemployed a short while ago. Rather, we would expect the detrimental
effect of the hot hand fallacy to play a role for job seekers who have been unemployed for
a long time.
Another domain where biased probability judgment might have a substantial effect
on economic behavior is in the domain of consumption decisions. Assume that a cash-
constrained consumer has to decide whether to make a large purchase that exceeds the
amount of funds that is currently available in his bank account. Thus, in order to make the
purchase, the consumer would have to overdraw his account. In this context, the sequence
of random outcomes on which the decision is based can be thought of as unexpected income
shocks that are either positive (e.g., finding a bank note on the sidewalk, winning money
in a game of poker with friends) or negative (e.g., receiving a speeding ticket, having a
bill to pay that is higher than anticipated). The consumption decision will then depend
9For related work on the role of a worker’s personal job search history and the discouraged workers
effect, see Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2006a) and Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2006b).
10In the opposite case (in which a streak of job offers has occurred) the theoretical predictions are less
clear. Here, it is very likely that both a gambler’s fallacy type and a hot hand fallacy type are going to
accept one of the job offers and therefore stop searching for a job.
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on the belief whether it is likely that a positive income shock occurs in the near future.
If this probability is high, it is optimal to overdraw the bank account for the short period
until the positive income shock realizes. If, instead, this probability is low, it is optimal
to postpone the purchase until it can be made without overdrawing the account.
Again, we are interested in a situation where the decision maker has experienced a
streak of similar outcomes. Consider the case in which a streak of negative income shocks
has occurred. The probability judgment biases lead to the following behavioral predictions:
if the consumer is prone to the gambler’s fallacy, he will have the belief that the streak of
negative income shocks is likely to end, such that a positive income shock will realize with
a high probability in the near future. Thus, his inclination to overdraw the bank account
in order to make the purchase will be high. In contrast, the hot hand fallacy will lead
to the opposite prediction: if the consumer believes that the streak of negative income
shocks is likely to continue, he will refrain from overdrawing his account and will not make
the purchase.11 In sum, a person who is prone to the gambler’s fallacy is predicted to be
more likely to have an overdrawn bank account, as the biased belief that a positive income
shock is “due” can lead to persistent household debt. By contrast, a person who is prone
to the hot hand fallacy will be less likely to have an overdrawn bank account.
1.4.2. Empirical Results. To test the predictions regarding employment status
with our data, we run two sets of regressions. First, we estimate a probit model in which
the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent is registered as unem-
ployed at the time of the interview. In a second set of regressions, the dependent variable
is an indicator for whether the respondent is long-term unemployed, i.e., registered as
unemployed for 12 months or more. As explanatory variables, we include dummies for the
observed cognitive biases: the gambler’s fallacy, the hot hand fallacy, and the answer “I
don’t know”. The reference group consists therefore of those respondents who answered
the probability judgment task correctly. Results from regressions with the unemployment
dummy as dependent variable are presented in Table 1.5. In column (1) we control only
for age and gender and find that both the hot hand dummy and the gambler’s fallacy
dummy are positive and weakly significant. Adding controls for education and for wealth
renders both coefficients insignificant, see columns (2) and (3).
11Predictions in the opposite case (in which a streak of positive income shocks has occurred) are
ambivalent: if the consumer is prone to the hot hand fallacy, he will believe that the positive income
shocks are going to continue and he will decide to make the large purchase. If the respondent is prone to
the gambler’s fallacy instead, he will expect that a negative income shock is likely to occur in the near
future. Still, if the streak of positive income shocks has led to a large amount of funds available in his
account, he might nevertheless make the purchase.
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Table 1.5: Economic Outcomes - Unemployment
Dependent variable:
1 if unemployed 1 if long-term unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if gambler’s fallacy 0.045* 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.019 0.025
[0.028] [0.027] [0.031] [0.023] [0.022] [0.025]
1 if hot hand 0.089** 0.058 0.056 0.089*** 0.064** 0.061*
[0.046] [0.043] [0.046] [0.042] [0.038] [0.040]
1 if “don’t know” 0.050 0.031 0.031 0.060* 0.044 0.052
[0.045] [0.043] [0.053] [0.040] [0.037] [0.046]
Age -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
1 if female -0.026 -0.026 -0.033 -0.021 -0.019 -0.022
[0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018]
Years of -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.013**
schooling [0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005]
Household -0.012*** -0.008***
wealth [0.002] [0.002]
N. Obs. 985 938 733 985 938 733
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.066 0.117 0.029 0.058 0.119
Table 1.5: Economic Outcomes - Unemployment. Probit estimates, marginal effects evaluated at the mean with standard errors in parentheses.
In columns (1) to (3), dependent variable =1 if respondent is registered as unemployed on the day of the interview, =0 otherwise. In columns (4) to (6),
dependent variable =1 if respondent is registered as unemployed for more than 12 months, =0 otherwise. In all specifications, the reference category is
the group of people who answered the probability question correctly (“50%”). Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *,
respectively.
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As the predictions we developed in Section 1.4.1 are especially relevant in addressing
long-run effects, we concentrate our analysis in the next step on persons who have been
looking for a job for an extended period of time. Columns (4) to (6) present results from
regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for respondents who
are long-term unemployed. The explanatory variables are the same variables as before.
Our estimates show that, controlling for age and gender, the hot hand fallacy is positive
and significant at the 1%-level. Thus, the predictions regarding the effect of the hot hand
fallacy on long-term unemployment are supported by the data. If we control in addition
for respondents’ educational background, the coefficient for the hot hand fallacy remains
significant at the 5%-level. Even if we control for education and wealth, the coefficient
for the hot hand fallacy dummy remains significant at the 10%-level and the marginal
effect indicates that the probability of being long-term unemployed is increased by 6.1%-
points.12 Given that the baseline of long-term unemployment in the sample is 6.8%, this is
a considerable effect. We therefore conclude that our predictions regarding the detrimental
effect of the hot hand fallacy are supported in case of long-term unemployed job seekers.
Moreover, we find for all specifications that the gambler’s fallacy has no significant effect
on employment status, which is again in line with our predictions.
Next, we empirically test the predictions regarding consumption decisions of cash-
constrained consumers. To this aim, we analyze the interplay of probability judgment
biases and the decision to overdraw one’s bank account. In a first set of regressions,
the dependent variable indicates how many days per year a respondent’s bank account is
overdrawn. The variable can take on four distinct values, as the answer space was split
up into four intervals (0 days, 1 to 30, 31 to 90, more than 90 days). As explanatory
variables we include again the dummies for whether a person exhibits a bias in probability
judgment, with the reference group being those respondents who gave the correct answer
to the probability task. Results of ordered probit regressions are presented in columns (1)
to (3) of Table 1.6. The estimates show that the dummy for whether a respondent is prone
to the gambler’s fallacy is positive and significant at the 1%-level even if we control for
age, gender, and education. Adding controls for net household income and net household
wealth leaves the coefficient virtually unchanged and significant at the 5%-level. This gives
support to our prediction: people who are prone to the gambler’s fallacy have a higher
number of days per year on which their bank account is overdrawn.
12We deliberately chose not to control for household income in the unemployment regressions, in order
to avoid endogeneity problems.
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As it might be relatively complicated for respondents to assess the number of days per
year on which their account is in the negative, the survey also included the straightforward
question of whether a person’s account was overdrawn at the time of the interview. A look
at the raw data reveals large effects: out of the respondents who answer the probability
question correctly, 14.3% have an overdrawn bank account. In contrast, this figure is 24.5%
among the group of people who are prone to the gambler’s fallacy. Results of a probit
estimation with this simple measure as dependent variable are presented in columns (4)
to (6). The estimates are very similar to our earlier findings: in most specifications, the
coefficient on the gambler’s fallacy dummy is positive and significant at the 1%-level. The
marginal effects indicate that being prone to the gambler’s fallacy increases the probability
of having an overdrawn bank account by about 8.8%-points (p = 0.020), controlling for
age, gender, education, income, and wealth. This is a sizeable effect, as the share of
respondents with an overdrawn bank account is 16.6% in the total sample. Again, these
findings are in line with the predictions: the gambler’s fallacy has a substantial impact on
consumers’ decision to overdraw their bank account.
Taken together, our results support the behavioral hypotheses that were developed in
Section 1.4.1. In particular, we find that the gambler’s fallacy affects financial decision
making, whereas the hot hand fallacy has an impact on job search decisions. These findings
suggest that it is not biased probability judgment per se that affects economic outcomes.
Rather, depending on the context in which economic decisions are made, the specific form
of a person’s probability judgment bias plays a decisive role.
1.5. Conclusion
This chapter has addressed three closely related research questions. First, it investi-
gated people’s ability to make simple probability judgments. For this purpose, we used
a specifically designed probability judgment task that was administered to a representa-
tive sample of the German adult population. The results showed that more than a third
of the respondents was unable to answer the probability question correctly, indicating
that a substantial part of the population has difficulties with making simple probability
judgments. Among the incorrect answers, by far the most frequent bias was the gam-
bler’s fallacy, i.e., the tendency to overestimate the occurrence of alternations in random
sequences. Second, we have addressed the determinants of biased probability judgment.
Our results have shown that education (years of schooling) and a knowledge-based measure
of cognitive ability are positively related to performance in the probability judgment task.
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The third part of the chapter has explored the relation between the observed probability
judgment patterns and respondents’ behavior in two domains: job search and financial
decision making. The hot hand fallacy, i.e., the tendency to overestimate the occurrence
of streaks in random sequences, was shown to be significantly related to a higher proba-
bility of being long-term unemployed. In contrast, the gambler’s fallacy corresponds to a
higher probability of overdrawing one’s bank account.
Having established that biased probabilistic reasoning translates into inferior economic
outcomes, our finding regarding the impact of schooling becomes important from a policy
perspective. Our estimates have shown that schooling has a large and significant impact on
reducing people’s cognitive biases. The fact that the estimates were positive and significant
even if we controlled for cognitive ability suggests that the knowledge obtained in school
mitigates probability judgment biases in a direct way. Thus, it may be worthwile to put
a stronger focus on teaching simple probabilistic reasoning already in the early grades of
high school. More generally, an increased dissemination of basic knowledge about random
processes might help people to make better decisions in the economic domains of life.
From an applied perspective, our findings have straightforward implications for the
design of policy measures that lead to a debiasing of decision makers. With respect to
labor market policy, our results suggest that job centers should offer courses that teach
job-seekers about the probabilities that play a role in the application process. In partic-
ular, it could be helpful to point out to job-seekers that they should not rely on their
personal search history in order to form a belief about the probability with which future
applications will be successful. Rather than believing that their individual streak of un-
successful applications will be continued, job-seekers should learn to focus on more general
economic measures such as the overall labor market conditions. Similar policy implications
can be derived for the domain of household finances. Here, counselors who give advice to
over-indebted households could inform consumers who exhibit the gambler’s fallacy that
they should avoid to overestimate the probability of a positive income shock to occur in
the near future.
Of course, the analysis in this chapter has limitations. For instance, we were not
able to identify the exact channels through which a cognitive bias influences behavior.
While some of our results are in line with the gambler’s fallacy being a sign of over-
optimism (as in the overdrawn bank account measure), this behavior might as well be
related to time-inconsistent preferences (cf. Laibson 1997). In future research, we plan to
incorporate incentivized measures of people’s time and risk preferences into our analysis, in
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order to identify the channels through which biased probability judgment affects economic
behavior.
CHAPTER 2
The Non-Use of Bayes’ Rule: Representative Evidence on
Bounded Rationality
2.1. Introduction
Bayes’ rule is an important cornerstone of economic theory. It prescribes that agents
make decisions under uncertainty by correctly processing new information conditional on
the prior information they have. Experimental evidence suggests however that people of-
ten have difficulties with making judgments that involve conditional probabilities (Tversky
and Kahneman 1971, Grether 1980, Charness and Levin 2005). The consequences of flawed
probabilistic reasoning can be severe: for instance, an insufficient understanding of the im-
portance of base rates has resulted in suicides of blood donors who were mistakenly tested
positive for HIV in the 1980s, and incorrect use of probabilistic information has led to
wrongful convictions in criminal cases (for detailed accounts, see Gigerenzer 2003). De-
spite an increased interest in behavioral deviations from the Bayesian updating model,
insights about the determinants of biased probability judgment remain scarce. Moreover,
little is known about the prevalence of judgment biases in the general population. Exist-
ing studies have been restricted to selected groups, such as university students, chemical
workers, or medical doctors (Viscusi and O’Connor 1984, Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, and
Gigerenzer 2000).
In this chapter, we measure people’s ability for Bayesian reasoning in a representative
sample of the German population, consisting of more than 1,000 observations. This ap-
proach enables us to evaluate the actual prevalence of cognitive biases that are described
in the experimental literature. In addition, we analyze the determinants of biased prob-
ability judgment by relating respondents’ probability estimates to individual background
characteristics such as education, cognitive ability, gender, and age.
The question we use to elicit respondents’ ability in assessing conditional probabilities
is framed as a judgment about weather conditions. This framing embeds the task in
a context in which respondents are likely to be familiar with probabilities, as weather
forecasts in TV and radio often refer to probabilistic measures. Participants received all
information in form of natural frequencies, which has been shown to enhance participants’
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performance (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995). The exact wording of the question was as
follows (translated from German):1
Imagine you are on vacation in an area where the weather is mostly sunny and
you ask yourself how tomorrow’s weather will be. Suppose that, in the area you
are in, on average 90 out of 100 days are sunny, while it rains on 10 out of 100
days. The weather forecast for tomorrow predicts rain. On average, the weather
forecast is correct on 80 out of 100 days. What do you think is the probability, in
percent, that it is going to rain tomorrow?
Respondents had to answer with a number between 0% and 100%. Alternatively, they
could give the answer “I don’t know”.
The normative solution to this question is a rain probability of about 31%.2 Although
the problem may seem complicated at first, an easy way to solve it is by finding the
correct information partition. Out of 100 days, the sun shines on 90 days and it rains
on 10 days. For the 90 sunny days, the weather forecast predicts sunshine on 72 days
and rain on 18 days. For the 10 rainy days, it predicts sunshine on 2 days and rain on
8 days. Thus, given that the forecast predicts rain, the probability that it will actually
rain is 8/(18 + 8) ≈ 31%. The structure of our question is very similar to the “cab
problem”, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1972). However, in order to identify
correct answers without ambiguity, we modified the base rate in our task such that the
Bayesian solution is neither close to the base rate (10%), nor to the middle of the answer
space (50%), which might be a focal point.3
Our results show that only a very small proportion of answers is close to the Bayesian
solution. In particular, we find that none of the respondents gives the correct answer
of 31%. A probability of 30% is indicated by 2.8% of the respondents, and the interval
31% ± 10%-points contains only 5.9% of all answers. The most frequent bias we find
in the data is consistent with the so-called base rate neglect, a phenomenon that is well-
established in the cognitive psychology literature (Bar-Hillel 1980, Tversky and Kahneman
1982, Koehler 1996). In terms of our task, this bias implies that respondents ignore the
1The original wording was: “Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie sind im Urlaub in einer Gegend, in der meistens
scho¨nes Wetter ist und Sie fragen sich, wie wohl morgen das Wetter sein wird. Angenommen an Ihrem
Urlaubsort scheint im Durchschnitt an 90 von 100 Tagen die Sonne und an 10 von 100 Tagen regnet es.
Fu¨r morgen lautet der Wetterbericht der Wettervorhersage dass es regnen wird. Die Wettervorhersage
sagt das Wetter fu¨r den na¨chsten Tag im Durchschnitt an 80 von 100 Tagen richtig voraus. Was glauben
Sie: Wie hoch ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, ausgedru¨ckt in Prozent, dass es morgen regnet?”.
2Bayes’ rule: Pr(R|RF ) = Pr(RF |R) Pr(R)
Pr(RF )
= 0.8∗0.1
0.9∗0.2+0.1∗0.8 = 0.308.
3In the cab problem, the probability with which the additional information is correct is 80% (as it is
in our task), but the base rate is 15% instead of 10%, leading to a Bayesian posterior of 41%. This can
make interpretation of the results problematic, as the correct solution is then relatively close to the focal
point of 50%.
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information about the base rate of rainy days and concentrate only on the probability
with which the weather forecast is correct. The resulting estimate of 80% is given by
24.2% of the sample. Thus, in the setup under investigation, base rate neglect is over
four times as frequent as answers that are located in the 10%-point interval around the
Bayesian solution. Another bias that is well-known from the psychological literature is
the tendency to answer with the pure base rate. In our setup it leads respondents to an
estimate that is equal to the prior probability of rain, ignoring the information provided
by the weather forecast. The corresponding answer, an estimate of 10%, is given by 10.8%
of the sample. Taken together, this set of results has two important implications: first, in
a representative sample of the population, only a very small fraction of answers is close to
the normatively correct answer. Second, deviations from the Bayesian solution appear to
be systematic, as certain mistakes are by far more frequent than others.
The main goal of this chapter is an assessment of the prevalence of probability judgment
biases and an analysis of their determinants. We deliberately do not address the question
of whether a certain bias leads to “good” or “bad” estimates, as this depends crucially
on the specific parameters of the decision environment. For instance, when looking at the
bias of base rate neglect, it follows directly from Bayes’ rule that the difference between
the Bayesian posterior and the base rate neglect estimate becomes very large for base rates
close to 0%, whereas it becomes negligible for base rates close to 50%. To illustrate this
point, assume the base rate of rainy days in our weather task was not 10%, but 5%. The
resulting posterior would be 17.4%, which is far away from the estimate of 80% that is
obtained by base rate neglect. In contrast, a base rate of 45% would lead to a Bayesian
posterior of 76.6%, which is very close to the base rate neglect estimate. Thus, from a
decision-making perspective, base rate neglect can be a useful heuristic in environments
where the base rate of an event is close to 50%. The question of whether respondents realize
under which circumstances a certain heuristic is more useful than another is beyond the
scope of this chapter.
In the economic literature, a common explanation for the existence of judgment biases
is bounded rationality: people decide rationally under the constraint that they have cog-
nitive limitations which may prevent them from finding the normatively correct solution
(for an overview, see Conlisk 1996). Therefore, when analyzing the determinants of biased
probability judgment, proxies for respondents’ cognitive ability are of particular interest.
A unique feature of our data set is that it includes two simple measures of cognitive ability
which are based on two sub-modules from one of the most widely used IQ tests. Moreover,
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the data contain information on respondents’ years of schooling and on whether they hold
a university degree. As control variables, respondents’ age and gender are included.
Our empirical analysis of the determinants of biased probability judgment leads to
surprising results: a high level of education does not increase the likelihood of giving
an answer that is close to the Bayesian solution. Rather, we find that highly educated
respondents are more likely to exhibit base rate neglect. These effects are particularly
pronounced for people with an academic background: among respondents who hold a uni-
versity degree, 37.9% give the base rate neglect estimate of 80%, and 2.6% give an answer
that is in the 10%-point interval around the Bayesian solution. In contrast, among respon-
dents without a university degree, 22.4% are prone to base rate neglect, and 6.3% give an
answer in the Bayesian interval. Stratifying the sample by years of schooling leads to very
similar results, with the share of base rate neglect being much higher among respondents
with more than 10 years of schooling (31.5% vs. 20.6%). We confirm the statistical signif-
icance of our findings in a number of regressions, controlling for respondents’ background
characteristics. In particular, marginal effect estimates from probit regressions reveal that
the probability to commit base rate neglect is roughly 15%-points higher for respondents
who hold a university degree, controlling for cognitive ability, age, and gender. In a similar
vein, one additional year of schooling leads to a 2%-point increase in the probability to
commit base rate neglect. Furthermore, our estimates show that the impact of cognitive
ability is very similar to the impact of education: a higher score in the cognitive ability
measures significantly increases the probability to commit base rate neglect and leads to
estimates that are further away from the normative solution. A series of robustness checks
shows that our results continue to hold when estimating multinomial logit models and
when using a linear measure of respondents’ biases.
An interpretation of our results in light of standard theories of human decision making
seems difficult, as all our measures for education and for cognitive ability have a significant
detrimental effect on respondents’ probability judgment. Even approaches that allow for
bounded rationality, e.g., by incorporating deliberation cost (Smith and Walker 1993),
cannot explain our findings. In a cognitive task as complex as the one we use in this
chapter, one would expect deliberation cost to be relatively high for people with less
formal education. In contrast, for highly educated people deliberation cost should be
relatively low. Other things equal, this reasoning would imply that more educated people
perform better in assessing conditional probabilities. Our results indicate the contrary, as
education, in particular university education, increases the likelihood that respondents are
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led astray in the probability judgment task. An identification of the exact channels which
are responsible for the detrimental effect of education and cognitive ability on Bayesian
judgment is beyond the scope of this chapter.
From a methodological viewpoint, the design of our study allows us to draw conclu-
sions about the general population that cannot always be obtained with non-representative
subject pools. Unfortunately, an adequate comparison of our findings to results from pre-
vious research is difficult, as most psychological studies do not report the full distribution
of answers. Rather, their focus is either on the share of base rate neglect in the data,
or on the share of Bayesian answers, depending on the respective research question. In a
seminal study by Casscells, Schoenberger, and Graboys (1978), 60 students and staff from
Harvard Medical School were asked to estimate the probability that a patient actually has
a disease, given a positive result in a diagnostic test. Parameters of the question were
chosen such that the normatively correct answer is approximately 2%, whereas base rate
neglect leads to an estimate of 95%. Results show that about 18% of the participants give
the correct answer. In contrast, almost half of the respondents exhibit base rate neglect.
The average estimate in the sample is 56%. Eddy (1982) reports from a similar study
that among 100 physicians, 95 exhibit base rate neglect. In an overview article, Tversky
and Kahneman (1982) state that base rate neglect is typically both the modal answer and
the median answer in Bayesian updating tasks. Unfortunately, their article neither con-
tains figures regarding the exact share of respondents committing base rate neglect, nor
does it report the typical share of normatively correct answers. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
(1995) investigate 15 distinct Bayesian updating tasks in order to show that presenting
information in natural frequencies instead of probabilities enhances respondents’ tendency
to apply Bayesian reasoning. The experiments were conducted with 60 undergraduates
(mainly psychology majors) from the University of Salzburg, Austria. In the updating
task that is most similar to the one we use in this chapter, the authors find that about
15% of the sample give the Bayesian answer. However, no information is reported about
the distribution of non-normative answers. In particular, nothing is said about the share
of subjects who exhibit base rate neglect or who answer with the pure base rate. A study
that reports a full picture of the answers in a Bayesian updating task is provided by Cos-
mides and Tooby (1996). The task used in their study is a standard medical diagnosis
problem, where the base rate of the disease is 0.1% and the false positive rate of the diag-
nostic test is 5%. The Bayesian posterior for having the disease, conditional on a positive
test result, is approximately 2%. In their sample of 25 Stanford undergraduates, base rate
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neglect is exhibited by 14 subjects (56% of the sample), whereas 3 subjects (12%) give the
Bayesian answer, and another 3 subjects (12%) answer with the pure base rate. Closest
to our analysis is a study by Stanovich and West (1998) who analyze the relationship
between respondents’ cognitive ability and their assessment of probabilities in a sample of
211 psychology undergraduates. We address their findings in detail when discussing our
results in Section 2.3.4.
In comparison to previous research, the share of base rate neglect in our sample is much
lower than it is in studies with non-representative subject pools. Taking our analysis of the
determinants of probabilistic judgment biases at face value, one reason for this difference
are the different education levels of participants in our study and participants in previous
research. The existing studies have mostly been conducted with academically trained
individuals. In contrast, only 12% of the respondents in our representative data set hold
a university degree. Finding a much higher share of base rate neglect in samples that
consist entirely of academically trained subjects is in line with our empirical analysis of the
determinants of biased probability judgment, as our results have shown that the likelihood
of being prone to this particular bias rises significantly with respondents’ education level.
These findings are important: one might be tempted to conclude from previous studies that
base rate neglect must be an extremely widespread phenomenon, since tests with highly
sophisticated students and professionals should constitute a lower bound for the prevalence
of flawed decision making in the general population. Our results are not consistent with
this view. In light of our findings, it is likely that previous studies with highly educated
subjects resulted in an upper bound for the prevalence of base rate neglect.
When considering the share of Bayesian answers and the share of answers that give
the pure base rate, generalizing the results from student subject pools to the population
at large seems much more appropriate. In these two domains, differences between our
findings and the existing literature are relatively small. This is again in line with our
empirical analysis of the underlying determinants, as we find that respondents’ level of
education has neither a significant impact on their likelihood to give a Bayesian estimate,
nor on their likelihood of answering with the pure base rate.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 contains a description
of the data, Section 2.3 presents the results, while Section 2.4 concludes.
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Table 2.1: Sample Statistics
Variable average std. dev. num. obs.
1 if female 0.537 (0.499) 1,012
Age 47.555 (18.371) 1,011
Word fluency test (raw data) 22.893 (10.933) 849
Word fluency test (standardized) 0 (1) 849
Perceptual speed test (raw data) 28.339 (9.853) 902
Perceptual speed test (standardized) 0 (1) 902
Years of schooling 10.328 (1.829) 965
1 if university degree 0.118 (0.322) 1,012
Table 2.1: Sample Statistics.
2.2. Data
The data set under investigation is a representative sample of the population living in
Germany aged 16 years and older. It is the same data set as in Chapter 1.4 For details on
the way the data were collected see Section 1.2. In total, 988 participants answered the
probability question. In addition, the data contain a number of background characteristics
such as age, gender, and education. A novel feature of the survey is that it elicited
measures of respondents’ cognitive ability. One measure elicits respondents’ perceptual
speed through a test in which participants have to find correspondences between symbols
and digits. The other measure is a word fluency test that provides a proxy of respondents’
general knowledge. The detailed design of these two measures has been described in the
previous chapter (see Section 1.2).
Sample statistics are shown in Table 2.1. About 53.7% of the sample are female, av-
erage age is 47.6 years, and respondents have on average 10.3 years of schooling. The
measures for cognitive ability have a mean value of 28.3 (perceptual speed test) and 22.9
(word fluency test). For the empirical analysis, both cognitive ability measures are stan-
dardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Histograms of the two standard-
ized measures have been presented in Figure 1.1.
2.3. Results
2.3.1. Prevalence of Biased Probability Judgment. A first look at the results
shows that respondents’ estimates regarding the probability of rain are spread out over the
4A full overview of the original survey has been given in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.1: Answers to Conditional Probability Question. The normatively correct
solution is a rain probability of about 31%. The 129 observations for the answer “I don’t know”
are not shown.
full range of the answer space (Figure 2.1). Still, we find that none of the 988 respondents
gives the Bayesian answer of 31%. A rain probability of 30% is indicated by 2.8% of
the respondents, and only 3.0% of answers are in the interval 31% ± 5%-points. Even
the interval 31% ± 10%-points contains only a small share (5.9%) of all answers. Taken
together, these findings show that a large majority of the respondents has difficulties with
making Bayesian judgments in the setting at hand, as their estimates are far away from
the normatively correct solution.
Next, we analyze the non-normative answers in the sample. Table 2.2 provides an
overview of typical judgment biases and shows their prevalence in our data. Recall that
a common bias described in the literature on conditional probability judgment is base
rate neglect. We find that, in our setting, the corresponding estimate of 80% is given
by 24.2% of the respondents. Thus, almost a quarter of the respondents chooses in line
with the most prominent prediction for biased probability judgment. A second bias that
is often reported in the literature is respondents’ tendency to focus only on the base rate,
thereby ignoring the information provided in addition to the base rate probability. The
corresponding estimate of 10% is given by 10.8% of the sample, and the 10%-point interval
around the pure base rate estimate contains 20.7% of all answers.
In sum, we find that in our setup the share of respondents who exhibit base rate neglect
is about four times as large as the share of respondents whose answer is located in the
Bayesian interval. Moreover, the pure base rate interval contains more than three times
2.3. RESULTS 35
Table 2.2: Bayesian Solution vs. Typical Judgment Biases
Resulting % of answers
Solution process
answer in sample
Bayesian: Pr(RF |R)∗Pr(R)
Pr(RF )
= 0.8∗0.1
0.9∗0.2+0.1∗0.8 = 0.308

30% 2.8%
(20%,40%] 5.9%
Pure base rate: Pr(R) = 0.1

10% 10.8%
[0%,20%] 20.7%
Base rate neglect: Pr(RF |R) = 0.8 80% 24.2%
Other: 49.2%
Table 2.2: Bayesian Solution vs. Typical Judgment Biases. Category “Other” consists
of all answers in the intervals (40%,60%], (60%,80%), (80%,100%], and “I don’t know”. A full
overview of the data is given in Appendix B.
as many answers as the Bayesian interval. These results are a clear indication that the
pattern of incorrect answers is non-random. It is very unlikely that the observed deviations
from the normative solution are due to an error source like lack of concentration or lack
of motivation. Rather, the data pattern indicates that respondents’ answers are driven by
systematic biases in probabilistic judgment.
2.3.2. Determinants of Biased Probability Judgment. If probability judgment
biases occur due to boundedly rational behavior, we should expect a significant relationship
between respondents’ probability estimates and proxies for their cognitive ability. We
therefore proceed to investigate the interplay between respondents’ answers on the one
hand and their performance in the cognitive ability tests and their education levels on
the other. The descriptive statistics in Table 2.3 reveal a striking finding: stratifying the
sample according to years of schooling indicates that highly educated people are much
more likely to commit base rate neglect, whereas they do not have a higher likelihood to
give an answer that is close to the Bayesian solution. We find that 31.5% of those with
more than 10 years of schooling exhibit base rate neglect, and 4.9% give answers in the
interval that contains the Bayesian solution. In contrast, among people with at most 10
years of schooling, only 20.6% commit base rate neglect, and 6.3% give an answer in the
Bayesian interval. The effect of education is even more pronounced if we focus our analysis
on respondents with a university education: among those who hold a university degree,
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
Pure base Base rate
Bayesian
rate neglect
Other Total
All 58 (5.9%) 205 (20.7%) 239 (24.2%) 486 (49.2%) 988 (100%)
Years of schooling > 10 16 (4.9%) 68 (21.0%) 102 (31.5%) 138 (42.6%) 324 (100%)
Years of schooling ≤ 10 42 (6.3%) 137 (20.6%) 137 (20.6%) 348 (52.4%) 664 (100%)
University degree 3 (2.6%) 30 (25.9%) 44 (37.9%) 39 (33.6%) 116 (100%)
No univ. degree 55 (6.3%) 175 (20.1%) 195 (22.4%) 447 (51.3%) 872 (100%)
Word fluency > 0 26 (4.6%) 114 (20.2%) 151 (26.7%) 274 (48.5%) 565 (100%)
Word fluency ≤ 0 32 (7.6%) 91 (21.5%) 88 (20.8%) 212 (50.1%) 423 (100%)
Perceptual speed > 0 24 (4.2%) 112 (19.8%) 148 (26.2%) 281 (49.7%) 565 (100%)
Perceptual speed ≤ 0 34 (8.0%) 93 (22.0%) 91 (21.5%) 205 (48.5%) 423 (100%)
Female 31 (5.8%) 117 (22.0%) 116 (21.8%) 268 (50.4%) 532 (100%)
Male 27 (5.9%) 88 (19.3%) 123 (27.0%) 218 (47.8%) 456 (100%)
Age < 50 27 (4.9%) 107 (19.3%) 158 (28.5%) 262 (47.3%) 554 (100%)
Age ≥ 50 31 (7.1%) 98 (22.6%) 81 (18.7%) 224 (51.6%) 434 (100%)
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics. Table shows number of answers in each answer category.
“Bayesian” are answers in the interval (20%,40%] around the Bayesian solution of 30.8%. “Pure
base rate” are answers in the interval [0%,20%] around the pure base rate of 10%. “Base rate
neglect” are answers equal to 80%. Category “Other” consists of all answers in the intervals
(40%,60%], (60%,80%), (80%,100%], and “I don’t know”. Cognitive ability measures are
standardized.
37.9% are prone to base rate neglect, and 2.6% give an answer in the Bayesian interval.
In contrast, among people without university degree, 22.4% exhibit base rate neglect, and
6.3% give an answer in the Bayesian interval. Very similar results obtain when we split the
sample at the median according to the cognitive ability measures.5 A look at the control
variables gender and age reveals that there is a gender effect, with men being more likely
to commit base rate neglect (27.0% vs. 21.8%). A similar pattern can be seen for age,
with younger people being more likely to do base rate neglect (28.5% vs. 18.7%).
In the following, we use regression analysis in order to control for respondents’ back-
ground characteristics and to assess whether our findings are statistically significant. In
a first step, we analyze the determinants of base rate neglect, as this is both the most
commonly described phenomenon in the literature and the most frequent bias in our sam-
ple. We estimate a probit model with the dependent variable being equal to one if a
5In particular, in the group with high cognitive ability, the share of people who give an answer in the
Bayesian interval is about 4%, whereas it is about 8% in the group of people with lower cognitive ability.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Base Rate Neglect
Dependent variable: =1 if answer is 80% (base rate neglect), =0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Word fluency 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.038**
measure [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
Perceptual speed 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.040**
measure [0.015] [0.017] [0.018]
1 if female -0.053* -0.058* -0.045 -0.047
[0.030] [0.031] [0.029] [0.030]
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Years of schooling 0.019** 0.023***
[0.009] [0.008]
N. Obs. 844 843 802 895 894 850
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.012 0.014 0.024
Table 2.4: Determinants of Base Rate Neglect. Probit estimates, marginal effects
evaluated at the mean with standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is a dummy equal to
one if respondent’s answer is 80% (base rate neglect). Cognitive ability measures are
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and
10%-level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
respondent makes the mistake of base rate neglect. As explanatory variables we include
the measures of cognitive ability, age, gender, and years of schooling. The results are
presented in Table 2.4. We find that the significant determinants of whether a respondent
is prone to base rate neglect are cognitive ability and education. Remarkably, all these
measures have positive coefficients, meaning that people with better cognitive ability and
with more education are more likely to neglect the base rate information. For instance, the
estimates in column (6) of Table 2.4 show that an increase in the measure for perceptual
speed by one standard deviation leads to an increase in the probability to commit base
rate neglect by about 4%-points (p < 0.05), whereas an additional year of schooling leads
to an increase in this probability by another 2%-points (p < 0.01). In contrast, in most
specifications the effect of age and gender is not significant once we control for cognitive
ability and education.
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Table 2.5: The Role of Academic Background
Dependent variable: =1 if answer is 80%, =0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if university 0.155*** 0.170*** 0.144*** 0.167***
degree [0.047] [0.048] [0.052] [0.050]
1 if female -0.051* -0.052* -0.045
[0.027] [0.030] [0.029]
Age -0.003*** -0.002* -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Word fluency 0.038**
measure [0.017]
Perceptual speed 0.042***
measure [0.016]
N. Obs. 986 985 843 894
Prob > χ2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.025 0.027 0.027
Table 2.5: The Role of Academic Background. Probit estimates, marginal effects
evaluated at the mean with standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is a dummy equal to
one if respondent’s answer is 80% (base rate neglect). Cognitive ability measures are
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and
10%-level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The descriptive part of the analysis has already stressed that base rate neglect is
especially widespread among respondents who hold a university degree. This is an impor-
tant finding, as previous research on probability judgment has relied heavily on subject
pools consisting of university students and of academically trained professionals (e.g., in
medicine). In contrast, the representative nature of our study entails that only 12% of
the respondents have an academic background. The data set therefore allows us to assess
whether the behavior of people with a university education can be generalized to the be-
havior of the population at large. To study this question in a regression framework, we
define a dummy variable that is equal to one if the respondent holds a university degree,
and equal to zero otherwise. Results from probit regressions with the base rate neglect
dummy as dependent variable are shown in Table 2.5. The results are striking: controlling
for gender, age, and cognitive ability, people with a university degree are between 14 and
17%-points more likely to commit base rate neglect. Given that in the total sample the
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share of people who commit base rate neglect is about 24%, this is a substantial effect
that is difficult to be reconciled with existing theories of human decision making.
We have seen that, next to base rate neglect, a common judgment bias is respondents’
tendency to answer with the pure base rate. In our sample, 20.7% of all answers are in
the interval [0%,20%] where the pure base rate of 10% is located. Still, it is not clear what
the determinants of this bias are. As the descriptive statistics in Table 2.3 have shown,
stratifying the sample according to cognitive ability, age, gender, and education results
only in very little variation in the share of respondents whose estimate is located in the pure
base rate interval. For instance, this share is 21.0% among respondents with more than
10 years of schooling, whereas it is 20.6% among respondents with 10 years of schooling
or less. Similarly, for all other measures the share of respondents in the pure base rate
interval is always relatively close to 20%, indicating that these measures cannot explain
what the determinants of giving an estimate close to the pure base rate are. Analogous
to the previous analysis for base rate neglect, we performed probit regressions where the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for answers in the pure base rate interval
and equal to zero otherwise. In these regressions, none of the explanatory variables has
a significant impact. The same is true for probit regressions with the dependent variable
being equal to one if a respondent’s answer is exactly 10% (results not reported).
2.3.3. Robustness Checks. In this subsection we perform two sets of robustness
checks. First, in order to address the interplay of respondents’ answers and their back-
ground characteristics in more detail, we estimate multinomial logit models with the same
four answer categories we investigated earlier in the descriptive analysis.6 These regres-
sions allow us to test whether differences between the answer categories are statistically
significant. Second, we estimate regressions in which the dependent variable is the linear
distance between a respondent’s answer and the Bayesian solution. Using this continuous
measure enables us to analyze the determinants of biased probability judgment by taking
into account whether deviations are either closer or further away from the correct solution.
This might be relevant, e.g., in settings where estimates that are further away from the
correct solution entail a higher cost for the decision maker.
In the multinomial regression analysis, the dependent variable indicates in which of
the four categories a respondents’ answer is located: Bayesian, pure base rate, base rate
neglect, or “other”. The base category in the regressions is “other”. This allows us to
6All of our results are independent of the specific categorization we choose. For multinomial logit
regressions with a more detailed grid of seven answer categories, see Appendix B.
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check - Multinomial Analysis (I)
Dependent variable: =1 if “Other”, =2 if BRN, =3 if PBR, =4 if Bayesian
(1) (2)
Base rate Pure base
Bayesian
Base rate Pure base
Bayesian
neglect rate neglect rate
Word fluency 0.185** -0.027 -0.108
measure [0.090] [0.098] [0.185]
Perceptual speed 0.191* 0.004 -0.228
measure [0.104] [0.108] [0.182]
Years of 0.113** 0.080 -0.264** 0.128*** 0.068 -0.257***
schooling [0.049] [0.052] [0.104] [0.048] [0.051] [0.095]
1 if female -0.258 0.172 0.019 -0.224 0.096 -0.005
[0.175] [0.187] [0.335] [0.170] [0.181] [0.311]
Age -0.004 0.005 0.003 -0.000 0.007 0.002
[0.005] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010]
Constant -1.480** -1.972*** 0.192 -1.831*** -1.901*** 0.237
[0.616] [0.661] [1.157] [0.602] [0.649] [1.081]
N. Obs. 802 850
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.020
Table 2.6: Robustness Check - Multinomial Analysis (I). Multinomial logit estimates,
standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable =1 if “Other” (answer either in the intervals
(40%,60%], (60%,80%), (80%,100%], or “Don’t know”), =2 if Base rate neglect (answer equal to
80%), =3 if Pure base rate (answer in [0%,20%]), and =4 if Bayesian (answer in (20%,40%]). The
reference category is “Other”. Cognitive ability measures are standardized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and *,
respectively.
address the factors that determine whether a respondent gives a Bayesian estimate or
whether he displays a typical judgment bias. The estimation results support all the earlier
findings from the descriptive analysis (see Table 2.6). For the specification in panel (1),
the coefficient for years of schooling indicates that respondents with more education have
a significantly higher probability of doing base rate neglect (p < 0.05) and a significantly
lower probability of giving an answer that is located in the Bayesian interval (p < 0.05).
Note that these results were obtained from a regression that included the knowledge-based
measure of cognitive ability as a control variable. If we control for perceptual speed instead,
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Table 2.7: Robustness Check - Multinomial Analysis (II)
Dependent variable: =1 if “Other”, =2 if BRN, =3 if PBR, =4 if Bayesian
(1) (2)
Base rate Pure base
Bayesian
Base rate Pure base
Bayesian
neglect rate neglect rate
Word fluency 0.181** -0.055 -0.298*
measure [0.088] [0.097] [0.169]
Perceptual speed 0.152 -0.033 -0.457***
measure [0.099] [0.104] [0.158]
1 if university 0.924*** 0.707** -0.137 1.014*** 0.696** -0.282
degree [0.261] [0.285] [0.630] [0.250] [0.275] [0.625]
1 if female -0.224 0.203 0.009 -0.207 0.135 -0.043
[0.171] [0.184] [0.307] [0.167] [0.178] [0.289]
Age -0.008 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 0.004 -0.009
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009]
Constant -0.274 -1.128*** -1.951*** -0.424 -1.162*** -1.673***
[0.254] [0.279] [0.444] [0.280] [0.302] [0.454]
N. Obs. 843 894
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.021
Table 2.7: Robustness Check - Multinomial Analysis (II). Multinomial logit estimates,
standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable =1 if “Other” (answer either in the intervals
(40%,60%], (60%,80%), (80%,100%], or “Don’t know”), =2 if Base rate neglect (answer equal to
80%), =3 if Pure base rate (answer in [0%,20%]), and =4 if Bayesian (answer in (20%,40%]). The
reference category is “Other”. Cognitive ability measures are standardized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and *,
respectively.
the impact of education becomes even stronger (see panel (2) of Table 2.6). Again, more
years of schooling increase the probability of exhibiting base rate neglect (p < 0.01) and
reduce the probability of giving a Bayesian answer (p < 0.01). In addition, higher cognitive
ability makes it more likely to commit base rate neglect. Conditional on education and
cognitive ability, the estimates for age and gender are not significant.
Next, we address our earlier finding that people with an academic background have
a strong tendency to commit base rate neglect. We therefore conduct multinomial logit
regressions similar to the ones in Table 2.6. The only difference in the specification is
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Table 2.8: Robustness Check - Linear Distance
Dependent variable: distance from 30.8% (in %-points)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Word fluency 2.032*** 1.487**
measure [0.700] [0.719]
Perceptual speed 2.746*** 1.826**
measure [0.756] [0.801]
1 if female -0.546 -0.573 -0.143 -0.141
[1.364] [1.385] [1.317] [1.339]
Age -0.101** -0.109*** -0.060 -0.087*
[0.039] [0.042] [0.043] [0.047]
Years of Schooling 0.808** 0.929**
[0.383] [0.371]
Constant 40.393*** 32.590*** 38.388*** 30.171***
[2.046] [4.787] [2.219] [4.658]
N. Obs. 750 715 803 765
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.026 0.029 0.034
Table 2.8: Robustness Check - Linear Distance. OLS estimates, standard errors in
brackets. Dependent variable is the linear distance (in %-points) between a respondent’s answer
and the Bayesian solution of 30.8%. By definition, all observations where a respondent answered
“I don’t know” are excluded from the following analysis. Cognitive ability measures are
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level
is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Respondents who answered “I don’t know” are not
included.
that we now replace the measure for years of schooling by a dummy equal to one if
the respondent holds a university degree (see Table 2.7). The results confirm our earlier
finding: academic education leads to a significant increase in both the probability to give a
base rate neglect estimate (p < 0.01) and in giving the pure base rate estimate (p < 0.05).
In a final step, we present results from a series of OLS regressions where the dependent
variable is the linear distance from the normative solution (in %-points). This approach
allows us to take the cost of an error into account. In particular, one might assume that
estimates that are further away from the correct solution entail a higher cost to the decision
maker. Estimation results are shown in Table 2.8. We find that both the cognitive ability
measure and years of schooling have positive coefficients and are highly significant in all
specifications. This implies that, in the setup under investigation, higher cognitive ability
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and more education lead respondents to estimates that are further away from the Bayesian
solution. For instance, the estimates in column (4) indicate that a one standard deviation
increase in the measure for perceptual speed translates into an increase in the respondent’s
bias by 1.8%-points (p < 0.05), whereas an additional year of schooling increases this bias
by another 0.9%-points (p < 0.05). Notably, in all regressions the measure for perceptual
speed has a stronger detrimental effect than the word fluency measure. Among the control
variables, age has a significantly negative impact in most specifications, indicating that,
on average, older people tend to be further away from the Bayesian solution.
2.3.4. Related Work. To put our results into perspective, it is useful to address
the related work by Stanovich and West (1998) who analyze a sample of 211 psychology
undergraduates from a medium-sized U.S. university. The authors try to investigate the
relationship between respondents’ cognitive ability and their assessment of probabilities.
The study had subjects solve two conditional probability questions: the cab problem and a
standard medical diagnosis task. As a proxy for cognitive ability, respondents were asked
to report their test scores in the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), a standardized test for
college admissions in the United States.7 The parameters of the cab problem are chosen
such that the base rate is 15% and the additional info is correct with 80%, leading to a
Bayesian posterior of 41%. In contrast to our study, subjects were not asked for a precise
estimate but had to choose their answer from six alternative intervals: less than 10%,
10-30%, 30-50%, 50-70%, 70-90%, more than 90%. To report the findings, the authors
construct three categories: [0%,30%) for answers that rely too heavily on the base rate
(n=38), [30%,70%] for Bayesian answers (n=45) and (70%,100%] for answers that tend
to neglect the base rate (n=128, see Table 4 of their paper).8 The results show that the
average SAT scores for the three answer categories are rather similar: 1096, 1129, and
1145, respectively. None of the SAT score differences is significant at conventional levels.
In contrast, outcomes of the medical diagnosis task lead to significant results. Here, sub-
jects who score higher on measures of cognitive ability are more likely to exhibit base rate
neglect, which seems at first sight to be in line with the findings of our study. Unfortu-
nately, the medical diagnosis task from which this claim is derived does not allow for a
7Additional proxies for cognitive ability were elicited through specifically designed problems from the
psychology literature, e.g., the so-called Raven Matrices and the Nelson-Denny comprehension measure.
For simplicity, we focus on the results that relate to the SAT test score measure. Results for the other
measures of cognitive ability were very similar.
8Unfortunately, the intervals used in the data analysis are relatively large, and answers are not reported
in more detail. For instance, for an appropriate comparison of their results to our findings it would have
been interesting to know the share of subjects in the interval 30-50%, as these are closest to the Bayesian
solution of 41%.
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distinction between Bayesian answers and answers that are equal to the pure base rate:
the parameters are chosen such that the base rate is 0.1% and the additional information
is correct with 95%. The resulting Bayesian posterior is roughly 2%. Again, respondents
could choose their answer from the same six intervals used in the cab problem. For the
data analysis, the authors construct three categories: answers in [0%,10%) are interpreted
as Bayesian (!) estimates (n=36), answers in [10%,90%] are defined as “intermediate”
(n=57), and answers in (90%,100%] are said to neglect the base rate (n=118, see Table
5 of their paper). The results show that average SAT scores for the three categories are
1103, 1109, and 1153, indicating that test scores of subjects in the Bayesian interval and
in the intermediate interval are very similar, whereas test scores in the base rate neglect
interval are significantly higher (p < .025). However, a serious drawback of this analysis
is that Bayesian answers (“2%”) and answers that give only the pure base rate (“0.1%”)
are pooled together in the same category. Thus, it is not warranted to link the low av-
erage SAT score for this group exclusively to respondents who give a Bayesian estimate.
It could as well be that average SAT scores are lower for people who answered with the
pure base rate. In fact, in the cab problem mentioned above, the average SAT score is
indeed lowest in the pure base rate category. Therefore, the findings of Stanovich and
West (1998) should be taken with a grain of salt.
2.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated people’s ability for probabilistic judgment in a
representative sample of the German population. In particular, we have used a task that
has been specifically designed to test whether respondents are able to form conditional
probability estimates. Our results have shown that only very few answers are in the vicinity
of the Bayesian solution. Deviations from the normatively correct answer appear to be
systematic and the two most frequently described biases in the literature, base rate neglect
and pure base rate, feature prominently in the data. The analysis of the determinants of
biased probability judgment has led to surprising results: highly educated respondents do
not have a higher likelihood of giving a correct answer. Rather, they are significantly more
likely to commit the mistake of base rate neglect. In a similar vein, measures for cognitive
ability have a positive and highly significant impact on the probability that people commit
base rate neglect.
An important implication of our findings is that the existing research on decision mak-
ing with conditional probabilities does not translate one-to-one to the general population,
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as previous studies have mostly been conducted with university students and with aca-
demic professionals. It has to be noted, however, that our results may not be independent
of the task structure. In our task, base rate neglect is a bias that leads to estimates that
are far away from the Bayesian solution. In contrast, in situations where the base rate
neglect outcome is closer to the normatively correct solution, it might be a useful heuristic
to neglect the base rate. Taking our results at face value one would therefore expect that
highly educated respondents perform better than other respondents in settings where the
base rate neglect estimate is close to the Bayesian solution.

CHAPTER 3
Fungibility, Labels, and Consumption: Experimental
Evidence
3.1. Introduction
Fungibility of money is a central principle in economics. It implies that any unit of
money is substitutable for another. In the analysis of consumer choice, for example, fungi-
bility prescribes that consumption decisions are based exclusively on the consumer’s total
wealth—the composition of wealth is irrelevant (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). Fungi-
bility is assumed throughout most of economic theory. Some empirical findings, however,
cast doubt on the generality of this concept. A number of studies have demonstrated
that assuming a lack of fungibility explains several empirical phenomena that are hard
to reconcile with standard economic assumptions. Odean (1998), for example, analyzes
stock market behavior of individual investors and finds that they sell winning stocks too
soon and keep losing stocks too long. This finding is consistent with the assumption that
investors evaluate their stock holdings separately (i.e., treat them as non-fungible) and are
loss averse in each stock holding. Similar examples come from the fields of asset pricing
(Benartzi and Thaler 1995, Barberis, Huang, and Santos 2001), stock market participa-
tion (Barberis, Huang, and Thaler 2006), stock trading (Barberis and Huang 2001), and
life-cycle saving (Shefrin and Thaler 1988). Yet, surprisingly little is known about the
degree to which individual decision-making is in line with the notion of fungibility.
In this chapter, we experimentally test whether consumers treat different forms of
wealth as fungible. We combine a laboratory experiment and a randomized vignette
survey which both have the same general design: participants make a simple two-goods
consumption decision with one good being subsidized in a particular way. Subjects have a
cash budget and an additional lump-sum subsidy at their disposal. In the Cash treatment,
the subsidy is given in cash. In the Label treatment, the subsidy is given as an in-kind
benefit, i.e., it has to be spent on the subsidized good. The crucial feature of our design is
that the amount of the subsidy is lower than the amount that is spent on the subsidized
good in the optimum. Therefore, treatments merely differ in the label attached to the
subsidy; a rational consumer should not be influenced by whether the subsidy is given
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in cash or in kind. In contrast, a consumer who does not treat different income sources
as fungible will spend the in-kind subsidy disproportionately on the subsidized good.
Standard theory predicts consumption to be the same in both treatments. If we find that
consumption of the subsidized good is significantly higher in the Label treatment, we can
conclude that behavior is not consistent with the principle of fungibility.
The results of both studies show that many subjects do not act in line with fungibility.
In the laboratory experiment, average consumption of the subsidized good is close to
optimal in the Cash treatment, whereas it is significantly higher in the Label treatment.
Moreover, our findings document a substantial impact of subjects’ mathematical ability, as
subjects with relatively strong mathematical skills tend to act in accordance with standard
economic theory. By contrast, in the group of subjects with weaker mathematical skills, the
treatment difference is large and significant.1 This supports the view that the violation of
fungibility occurs for cognitive reasons which relates our study to recent work by Frederick
(2005), Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006), Casari, Ham, and Kagel (forthcoming), and
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2007). These studies show that people with higher
cognitive skills are more likely to behave in line with standard economic theory, whereas
people with lower cognitive skills tend to act in accordance with theories of boundedly
rational behavior.
We complement the laboratory analysis by conducting a vignette survey. The general
structure of the survey is analogous to the structure of the experiment. The survey is
designed such that the setting is as close as possible to participants’ everyday decisions,
and such that the choice set is very small. The results indicate that participants in the
Label treatment consume significantly more of the subsidized good. Moreover, this effect
is very pronounced among respondents with a relatively weak mathematical background.
In sum, the survey demonstrates that the findings of the laboratory experiment continue
to hold in a less abstract and very simple setting, confirming the external validity of our
experimental results.
Taken together, this chapter shows that consumers do not always treat money as
fungible, which has important implications for several areas of economic research. First,
our findings lend support to field studies that explain behavior of stock market investors
by assuming that investors are loss averse and do not treat different wealth components as
fungible (e.g., Odean 1998, Benartzi and Thaler 1995). These studies assume that investors
1An alternative source of the treatment effect could be that subjects feel morally obliged to comply
with the label on the subsidy and thus increase their consumption of the subsidized good. We try to
measure the moral attitudes of our subjects and find that these do not influence whether fungibility is
violated or not.
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evaluate each component of their portfolio (e.g., stock vs. bond holdings) separately. We
provide a direct test of this assumption. Second, our results are important for theories
of life-cycle saving which usually rely on the assumption of fungibility. Since we find
that even in a very simple setup fungibility does not hold for all subjects, our evidence
supports savings models in which the assumption of fungibility is relaxed (see, e.g., Shefrin
and Thaler 1988, Barberis and Huang 2001). Finally, the specific design of our study allows
us to give a rationale for the observed behavior of benefits recipients. Assuming a lack of
fungibility could explain why housing benefits have such a strong effect on market rents
as shown by Susin (2002), Gibbons and Manning (2006), and Fack (2006). Taking our
results at face value, even non-distortionary housing benefits can induce tenants to spend
a higher share of their income on housing. If landlords are aware of this behavior, they
can increase rents accordingly. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 3.5.
Why should people treat money as non-fungible? Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
suggest that decision makers often do not decide globally but rather evaluate parts of
a decision separately. This phenomenon has been called “narrow framing” (Kahneman
and Lovallo 1993) or “narrow bracketing” (Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin 1999). For the
allocation of a budget coming from different sources, making separate decisions implies
a violation of fungibility. Since assessing the decisions separately is cognitively less de-
manding, our finding that subjects with lower mathematical skills are more likely to ignore
fungibility also points to narrow bracketing as a potential explanation for the treatment
effect. Closely related to the consumption setup we analyze is the concept of “mental
accounting” (Thaler 1985, 1999). Mental accounting proposes that consumers use a set of
heuristics to deal with their day-to-day financial decisions. An important assumption is
that consumers have mental budgets for different expenditure categories or for different
investment categories, thereby constraining the fungibility of money. In this framework,
a label can influence consumption choice if it determines to which mental budget the
consumer assigns the benefit payment.2
Most empirical studies about fungibility rely on non-incentivized surveys (e.g., Heath
and Soll 1996, O’Curry 1997, Prelec and Loewenstein 1998, White 2006). Only few papers
investigate fungibility in incentivized laboratory experiments or in field settings. Gneezy
and Potters (1997), Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz (1997), and Rabin and
2Note that mental accounting can be an advantageous heuristic, e.g., when it helps the decision maker
to overcome self-control problems. In the setup we analyze in this study, however, deciding according to
mental accounting or narrow bracketing is a mistake that leads to a lower payoff.
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Weizsa¨cker (2007) find in incentivized experiments that subjects evaluate subsequent gam-
bles separately. Rockenbach (2004) examines investors’ behavior in a binomial option-
pricing task and finds that investors do not realize that the value of a call option in such
a setup is independent of the probability with which the good state of the world occurs.
This behavior is not in line with fungibility, but with investors evaluating safe and uncer-
tain investments separately. Arkes, Joyner, Pezzo, Nash, Siegel-Jacobs, and Stone (1994)
show that spending out of an unanticipated windfall gain is higher than out of an antici-
pated payment and Epley, Mak, and Idson (2006) find that framing such a windfall gain
as “bonus” instead of “rebate” increases spending even further.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: The design of the experiment
is described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents experimental results and analyzes expla-
nations for our findings, whereas Section 3.4 reports design and results of the vignette
survey. Section 3.5 discusses our findings and concludes.
3.2. Experimental Design
3.2.1. General Setup. The goal of this chapter is to experimentally test whether
individual behavior is in line with fungibility. We examine this question in a simple two-
goods consumption case where one good is subsidized in a particular way. Assume that a
consumer has a cash budget of amount R and a subsidy of amount S at his disposal. In
the Cash treatment, the subsidy is a lump-sum payment in cash. In the Label treatment,
the subsidy is of the same amount, but it is given in form of an in-kind benefit, i.e., it has
to be spent on the subsidized good. The crucial feature of our design is that the amount of
the subsidy is lower than the amount that is spent on the subsidized good in the optimum.
Thus, a rational consumer should not be influenced by whether the subsidy is given in
cash or in kind. The only difference between treatments is that the in-kind subsidy has a
label attached to it, whereas the cash subsidy has not.
Consider the indifference curve diagram in Figure 3.1, where the subsidized good (s)
is on the horizontal axis and the other good (o) is on the vertical axis. For simplicity, the
price of the subsidized good is normalized to ps = 1. When the consumer has only R at
his disposal, the optimal consumption bundle is A. In the Cash treatment, the budget
constraint is shifted to the right (dashed line) and the optimal consumption bundle is B.
In the Label treatment, the subsidy is paid in kind and the consumer faces a kinked budget
constraint (solid line). However, the kink does not affect optimal decision making, as the
amount of S is lower than the amount sB spent on the subsidized good in the optimum.
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Figure 3.1: Consumption Decision with Non-distortionary In-kind Benefit. The
subsidized good (s) is on the horizontal axis, the other good (o) is on the vertical axis. The
dashed line is the budget constraint when the subsidy is given in cash. The solid line is the
budget constraint when the subsidy is given in kind.
Thus, the subsidy is non-distortionary and the first-best choice B is feasible. Under the
assumption that fungibility holds, consumption should be identical across treatments.
Now consider a consumer who does not treat different income sources as fungible.
A violation of fungibility implies that the consumer has cognitive or mental sub-budgets
between which money cannot be shifted.3 In our setup, the consumer thus has a sub-
budget for the subsidized good, and a sub-budget for the other good. We assume that
a labeled payment is posted to the sub-budget for the corresponding good, whereas a
cash payment is allocated optimally to the two sub-budgets. In the Cash treatment, we
would still expect such a consumer to choose bundle B. As both income components are
cash, the consumer can optimally allocate the funds to the sub-budgets for the two goods
and thus choose the optimal consumption bundle. The difference to the standard model
occurs in the Label treatment. Here, the consumer will still allocate the cash endowment
optimally (bundle A). The subsidy, however, will be allocated to the sub-budget for the
subsidized good. In the extreme case where sub-budgets are completely non-fungible, the
entire subsidy will be spent on the subsidized good, resulting in consumption bundle C
where sC = sA + S (see Figure 3.1). If both goods are normal, sC ≥ sB.4 Therefore,
3A closely related concept that includes non-fungible sub-budgets as a building block is the concept
of “mental accounting” (Thaler 1985).
4Note that this reasoning depends on the assumption that the consumer decides first about the cash
budget and then about the subsidy payment. In contrast, if the consumer spent the subsidy first, he would
be able to allocate the cash budget so as to reach bundle B. In the experiment, we are therefore testing
the joint hypothesis of fungibility and order of spending.
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if some subjects do not treat money as fungible, we expect average consumption of the
subsidized good in the Label treatment to be higher than in the Cash treatment. This
does not exclude the possibility that some subjects act in line with fungibility, or that
others are only influenced to a certain extent by the label attached to the subsidy.
3.2.2. Laboratory Experiment. In the experiment, subjects made two subsequent
consumption decisions. The first decision stage, which we call reference stage, serves to
yield a reference transaction to which decisions in the second stage can be compared. The
second stage, called subsidy stage, is our main treatment stage. In both consumption
decisions, subjects allocated their budget on two goods. For each good we induced a
standard microeconomic utility function by specifying monetary payoffs for the possible
consumption levels. Subjects’ total payoff was the sum of the payoffs for each of the two
goods in both stages.
In the reference stage, subjects were endowed with a cash budget of 50 money units
which they could allocate freely on the two goods. In the subsidy stage, subjects had
again an endowment of 50 money units at their disposal, and additionally received a
subsidy payment of 30 money units. The only difference between the two treatments
is the form of this subsidy—the reference stage is identical in both treatments. In the
Cash treatment (CT), the subsidy was given as an unconditional cash grant. The CT
serves as our baseline treatment. In the Label treatment (LT), the subsidy was given as
an in-kind benefit. Importantly, we chose the parameters such that the in-kind benefit is
non-distortionary. By shifting the remainder of their budget appropriately, subjects could
reach the same optimal consumption level as in the CT.
The exact specification of the payoff function is presented in Table 3.1. Subjects could
buy up to 25 units of each good. Payoff is increasing in consumption, and marginal payoff
is weakly decreasing. For clarity, we call the two goods subsidized good and other good
throughout the chapter, although strictly speaking the subsidized good was only subsidized
in the second stage of the Label treatment. Prices per unit were ps = 3 for the subsidized
good and po = 2 for the other good. Payoff function and prices remained constant over
the course of the experiment. Budget left over in any stage could neither be saved nor did
it yield any payoff. There was no time limit for decisions. For the chosen parameters, the
consumption bundles (s, o) shown in Figure 3.1 are as follows: optimal consumption in
the reference stage is A = (12, 7), the optimal bundle in the subsidy stage is B = (13, 20),
and the consumption that corresponds to complete non-fungibility is C = (22, 7).
3.2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 53
Consumption (in units) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Payoff subsidized good 0 36 70 102 132 160 186 210 232 252
Payoff other good 0 30 57 81 102 120 135 147 157 166
Consumption (in units) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Payoff subsidized good 270 286 299 310 316 322 328 333 338 343
Payoff other good 175 184 192 200 208 216 223 230 237 244
Consumption (in units) 20 21 22 23 24 25
Payoff subsidized good 347 351 355 358 361 364
Payoff other good 251 256 261 266 271 276
Table 3.1: Payoff Functions Used in the Laboratory Experiment. “Subsidized good”
denotes the good that is subsidized in the subsidy stage of the Label treatment.
Subjects earned their initial endowment in a real-effort task. Before the start of the
reference stage, subjects had to count the number of zeros in large spreadsheets that
consisted of zeros and ones. When they managed to determine the correct number of
zeros in a given amount of time they earned 100 money units that were later split in
half for the two consumption decisions.5 We chose this rather boring activity to minimize
the intrinsic motivation subjects could have for the task and thus to strengthen their
perception of really having earned the money (cf. Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren 2002).
Subjects were students from the University of Bonn studying various majors except
Economics. Treatments were assigned randomly and no subject participated in more than
one treatment. At the beginning of the experiment, instructions were read aloud and
subjects had to complete a number of example questions to ensure that they understood
the task.6 Detailed instructions for the two stages were given later on the computer screen.
This allowed us to have subjects of both treatments in the same session and thus to align
the delivery of the two treatments as much as possible. At the end of the experiment,
subjects completed a questionnaire. The experiment was computerized using the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 92 subjects participated in the experiment, of whom one
subject failed to complete the real-effort task. This leaves us with 45 observations in
the Cash treatment and 46 observations in the Label treatment. Payoff points (cf. Table
3.1) were converted at a rate of 100 points = 1 Euro. In addition to their earnings from the
consumption decisions, subjects received a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro. On average, subjects
5The precise rules were as follows: subjects worked on 8 large tables with 300 entries each. To complete
the task, they had to count the correct number of zeros on four sheets within 15 minutes and submit this
number to the computer. If subjects did not complete the task, they only received an endowment of
10 money units.
6For an English translation of the instructions, see Appendix C.
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earned 12.20 Euro (∼14.80 USD at the time of the experiment). Sessions lasted between
60 and 70 minutes.
3.2.3. Vignette Survey. To test the external validity of our findings, we comple-
ment the laboratory analysis by conducting a vignette survey. The general structure is
analogous to the structure of the experiment: participants decide twice, in a reference
stage and a subsidy stage, and there are two treatments, a Cash treatment and a La-
bel treatment. The consumption decision was presented through a scenario (a vignette)
which was framed as the search for an apartment. Participants had to decide between two
apartments, a small and cheap one and a large and expensive one. All parameters in the
scenario were chosen to resemble participants’ actual housing decisions in life.
The survey differs from the experiment in two dimensions: (i) we do not induce a
utility function but rely on participants’ actual housing preferences, and (ii) the choice
set is very small, as participants had only two options to choose from. The survey is thus
a robustness check whether results of the experiment continue to hold in a simpler and
less abstract environment. A total of 525 students participated in the survey. None of the
respondents participated in the laboratory experiment. More details on the survey design
will be presented together with the results in Section 3.4.
3.3. Results
In this section we report results from the laboratory experiment. First, we show that
giving a labeled subsidy instead of a cash grant increases consumption of the subsidized
good. Then we present evidence that this effect is stronger for subjects with lower mathe-
matical ability. Finally, we demonstrate that subjects’ moral concerns cannot explain the
treatment effect.
3.3.1. Consumption in the Experiment. Before we turn to the subsidy stage, we
look at consumption decisions in the reference stage. Note that the design of the reference
stage is exactly the same in both treatments. In particular, subjects are not aware of the
fact that there will be two different treatments in the subsidy stage. Figure 3.2 shows
a histogram of consumption choices for the (later to be) subsidized good. Choices in
the Cash treatment are represented by grey bars, whereas choices in the Label treatment
are represented by black bars. We find that choices are very similar: the modal choice
in both treatments is the optimum of 12 units.7 Average consumption is close to the
7For ease of exposition, we report only the consumption of the subsidized good. Consumption of the
other good can then be readily calculated, as almost all subjects choose a consumption bundle that is on
the Pareto frontier. Our results do not change when we confine the analysis to the Pareto optimal choices.
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optimum, with 11.0 units in the Label treatment and 11.6 units in the Cash treatment.8
These findings indicate that subjects have understood the experimental task and took the
consumption decision seriously.
Next, we focus on outcomes in the subsidy stage. Our first result concerns the impact
of the labeled subsidy on consumption choice.
Result 1: In the Label treatment, consumption of the subsidized good is signifi-
cantly higher. The marginal propensity to consume out of the subsidy is twice as
large as in the Cash treatment.
A histogram of consumption choices is shown in Figure 3.3. Recall that the experiment is
designed such that the same optimal consumption bundle can be reached in both treat-
ments. If all subjects acted in line with fungibility, there should be no treatment dif-
ference. Results for the Cash treatment show that the modal choice is to consume the
optimal amount of the subsidized good (13 units), and average consumption is 14.4 units.
By contrast, we can see that the modal choice in the Label treatment is a consumption
of 20 units, and only a relatively small share of subjects choose the payoff-maximizing
amount of 13 units. Overall, subjects in the Label treatment buy too much of the subsi-
dized good, consuming 16.7 units on average. The treatment difference is highly significant
(U-test, p = 0.006).9 In Table 3.2 we provide OLS estimates of the treatment effect. The
estimates in columns (3) and (4) show that the label dummy is positive and highly signif-
icant. The coefficient has a value of about 2.3 consumption units (p = 0.006) and remains
unaffected when controlling for age and gender.10
The two-stage design of our experiment enables us to compute marginal propensities
to consume out of the subsidy payment by comparing decisions in the subsidy stage to
decisions in the reference stage. A histogram of the intra-person change in consumption is
shown in Figure 3.4. On average, the consumption increase in the Cash treatment is +2.8
units. In contrast, the average consumption change in the Label treatment is +5.7 units.
This difference is highly significant (p = 0.001). As the subsidy payment has a value of
10 units of the subsidized good, the resulting marginal propensity to consume out of the
subsidy is 57.4% in the Label treatment vs. 28.0% in the Cash treatment.
8An OLS regression indicates that the treatment difference is not statistically significant (see columns
(1) and (2) of Table 3.2). A U-test between treatments is however significant at the 10%-level (p = 0.066).
We are not worried about this marginal difference because consumption is slightly lower in the Label
treatment. Thus, if there is any inertia in subjects’ decisions, results from the reference stage work against
a potential treatment effect in the subsidy stage.
9All significance levels in this section are obtained from two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests.
10All regression results in Table 3.2 remain virtually unchanged if we perform tobit regressions instead
of OLS, adjusting for the fact that subjects could not consume more than 25 units of each good.
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Figure 3.2: Consumption of the Subsidized Good in the Reference Stage. In this
stage, the optimum is to buy 12 units of the subsidized good.
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Figure 3.3: Consumption of the Subsidized Good in the Subsidy Stage. In this stage,
the optimum is to buy 13 units of the subsidized good.
Our next result documents the considerable heterogeneity we observe in behavior
across individuals.
Result 2: A substantial part of the treatment difference is driven by subjects who
increase their consumption by the full amount of the subsidy.
As can be seen from Figure 3.4, the most frequent choice in the Cash treatment is a
consumption increase by either 1 or 2 units. In contrast, the modal choice in the Label
treatment is a consumption increase by 10 units. This decision implies that the entire
subsidy is spent on the subsidized good, on top of the consumption from the reference
stage. Subjects who treat the income sources as completely non-fungible will do exactly
this (cf. bundle C in Figure 3.1). In the Label treatment, 10 out of 46 subjects spend the
whole subsidy on the subsidized good, while this is true for only 1 out of 45 subjects in
3.3. RESULTS 57
0
5
10
15
20
25
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Consumption increase
P e
r c
e n
t a
g e
Cash
Label
Figure 3.4: Consumption Increase of the Subsidized Good from Reference Stage to
Subsidy Stage. The subsidy is worth 10 units of the subsidized good.
the Cash treatment. These subjects drive a substantial part of the treatment effect, but
not all of it. If we exclude these 11 subjects from the analysis, the treatment difference in
absolute consumption remains, but it becomes considerably smaller (1.4 units, previously
2.3 units; p = 0.089). The same is true for the treatment difference in consumption change
(1.9 units, previously 2.9 units; p = 0.002). Interestingly, subjects who spend the entire
subsidy on the subsidized good decide much faster than the remaining subjects. They need
on average 107 sec for their decision, whereas the other subjects need 234 sec, more than
twice as long. This difference suggests that spending the subsidy fully on the subsidized
good is the result of a simple decision heuristic, rather than being derived from extensive
deliberations.
3.3.2. Impact of Mathematical Ability. A consumer who does not treat different
income components as fungible reduces the complexity of his consumption decision. Thus,
ignoring fungibility can be seen as a form of “narrow bracketing” (Read, Loewenstein, and
Rabin 1999).11 Subjects with lower cognitive and mathematical skills will have a larger
gain from reducing the complexity of the decision. We therefore expect these subjects
to violate fungibility more often and, as a consequence, to be influenced more by the
treatment manipulation. In fact, Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999) conjecture that
narrow bracketing is negatively correlated with cognitive ability. Our next result supports
their intuition.
11Thaler (1985) argues that mental accounting, a concept similar to narrow bracketing, serves as a
heuristic to overcome problems of limited self-control. In our experimental setup, however, limited self-
control plays no role.
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative Distribution of the Consumption of the Subsidized Good
according to Mathematical Ability. Consumption decisions in the High-Math group (left
panel) and in the Low-Math group (right panel). The black line depicts consumption in the Cash
treatment, the grey line consumption in the Label treatment. In order to form a High-Math
group (n = 50) and a Low-Math group (n = 41) we elicited the math grades subjects obtained in
their high school completion exam and split the sample at the median.
Result 3: The treatment difference in consumption is larger for subjects with
lower mathematical ability.
To analyze the interplay of cognitive ability and the treatment effect we use subjects’ math
grade in their high school completion exam as a proxy. The grades were elicited in the
post-experimental questionnaire. In the German high school system, grades rank from
1 (excellent) to 5 (fail). We split the sample at the median, leading to a “High-Math”
group (n = 50) of subjects who had a math grade of either 1 or 2, and a “Low-Math”
group (n = 41) of subjects who had math grades of 3 or below.12 Since it could be that
mathematical ability impacts not only the decision in the Label treatment but also in the
Cash treatment, we compare the treatment difference within the High-Math group to the
difference within the Low-Math group.
Figure 3.5 presents cumulative percentages of consumption decisions in both treat-
ments. In the High-Math group (left panel), cumulative distributions are very close to
each other, suggesting that the label has no impact on consumption choices in this group.
In contrast, in the Low-Math group (right panel), there is a wide gap between the two dis-
tributions, especially in the range between 13 units (the optimum) and 20 units. Statistical
analysis shows that the treatment effect in the High-Math group is 0.9 units (p = 0.357). In
contrast, the treatment effect in the Low-Math group is 3.8 units (p = 0.004). Regression
analysis confirms that the difference between treatment effects is statistically significant
(see columns (5) and (6) in Table 3.2). The dependent variable is the consumption of the
12One particularity of the German high school system is the existence of two types of math courses:
intensive course and basic course. The results remain very similar when we take the type of math course
into account.
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Table 3.2: Consumption in the Laboratory Experiment
Dependent Variable: consumption of subsidized good (in units)
Reference Stage Subsidy Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 if Label Treatment -0.666 -0.652 2.273*** 2.270*** 0.911 0.869 2.091* 2.088*
[0.438] [0.439] [0.808] [0.818] [1.081] [1.103] [1.069] [1.081]
1 if Low-Math Group -0.796 -0.861
[1.160] [1.191]
Label * Low-Math 2.883* 2.960*
[1.615] [1.653]
1 if High-MO Group -0.970 -0.989
[1.157] [1.186]
Label * High-MO 0.240 0.254
[1.655] [1.676]
Age -0.077 0.021 0.047 -0.010
[0.075] [0.140] [0.141] [0.144]
1 if Female -0.402 0.132 0.068 0.115
[0.458] [0.852] [0.843] [0.858]
Constant 11.622*** 13.605*** 14.422*** 13.870*** 14.741*** 13.663*** 14.875*** 15.045***
[0.311] [1.769] [0.574] [3.293] [0.733] [3.259] [0.790] [3.511]
N. Obs. 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
Prob > F 0.132 0.270 0.006 0.057 0.010 0.046 0.036 0.132
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.011 0.071 0.051 0.091 0.071 0.062 0.040
Table 3.2: Consumption in the Laboratory Experiment. OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the consumption
of the subsidized good. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
60 3. FUNGIBILITY, LABELS, AND CONSUMPTION
subsidized good. As explanatory variables we include a treatment dummy (=1 if Label
treatment), a Math dummy (=1 if Low-Math) and the interaction of the two. Thus, the
reference category in these regressions is the group of High-Math subjects in the Cash
treatment. The estimates show that the label dummy becomes small (0.9 units) and in-
significant, indicating that subjects in the High-Math group do not exhibit a significant
treatment effect. In contrast, the coefficient of the interaction term is large (2.9 units) and
significant at the 10%-level. Controlling for age and gender leaves the significance level
unaffected, and the coefficient increases slightly, to 3.0 units.
We obtain similar results when we ignore the Cash treatment and directly compare
consumption of High-Math and Low-Math subjects in the Label treatment: subjects in the
Low-Math group consume on average 2.1 units more of the subsidized good (p = 0.066).
Recall that our earlier analysis has shown that subjects who spend the entire subsidy
on the subsidized good account for a substantial share of the treatment effect. Among
these subjects, the relation between mathematical ability and consumption behavior is
extremely pronounced: 82% of them are in the Low-Math group, compared to 45% of
subjects in the total sample. In sum, all our findings indicate that the treatment effect is
significantly larger for subjects with relatively low mathematical ability.
3.3.3. Moral Obligation as an Alternative Explanation? So far we have attrib-
uted the treatment difference to cognitive limitations that prevent subjects from treating
the two income components as fungible. However, one could also imagine that receiving
a benefit payment causes a feeling of moral obligation to spend the money in accordance
with the benefit giver’s intention. In response to the intention that is conveyed by the
label, recipients might increase their consumption of the subsidized good above the level
they would have chosen if they had received the same amount as an unconditional cash
payment. The next result shows that behavior in the experiment is not related to subjects’
attitudes towards moral obligation.
Result 4: A feeling of moral obligation to comply with the label on the subsidy
cannot explain the treatment difference in consumption.
To measure attitudes towards moral obligation, we included a scenario in the post-experimental
questionnaire in which subjects had to judge the behavior of a fictitious person. The sce-
nario read as follows (translated from German):13
13The exact wording was: ”Herr und Frau Mu¨ller haben zwei Kinder (5 und 8 Jahre) und verdienen
zusammen pro Monat 2000 Euro netto. Sie bekommen zusa¨tzlich pro Kind 180 Euro Kindergeld, also
insgesamt 360 Euro im Monat. Sie geben normalerweise jeden Monat ca. 300 Euro fu¨r die Kinder aus
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative Distribution of the Consumption of the Subsidized Good
according to Feelings of Moral Obligation. Consumption decisions in the High-MO group
(left panel) and in the Low-MO group (right panel). The black line depicts consumption in the
Cash treatment, the grey line consumption in the Label treatment. To form a High-MO group
(n = 38) and a Low-MO group (n = 53) we elicited subjects’ moral concerns and split the sample
at the median.
Mr and Mrs Miller have two children (5 and 8 years old). They earn a total
amount of 2000 Euro per month, after taxes. Additionally, they receive 180 Euro
child benefit per child, i.e., a total of 360 Euro per month. Usually, they spend
about 300 Euro per month for their children (child clothing, toys, etc.). They
spend the rest of the child benefit on other things (e.g., their own hobbies).
Subjects had to indicate on a point scale from 1 to 6 how they judge the fictitious persons’
behavior, 1 indicating “not justified at all” and 6 indicating “fully justified”.14 The decision
situation described in the scenario above is very similar to the consumption decision in
our experiment. In both situations, the intended use of the subsidy is obvious but the
subsidy is not binding, i.e., a rational decision maker should not be influenced by the label
attached to the subsidy.15 Analogous to our analysis of mathematical ability, we split the
sample at the median. This results in a group with strong moral obligation (“High-MO”,
n = 38) including all subjects who answered with a value of 3 or below, and a group with
weak moral obligation (“Low-MO”, n = 53) consisting of the remaining subjects.
Cumulative percentages for both groups are shown in Figure 3.6. The distributions
look very similar: in both panels there is a wide gap between the Cash treatment and the
Label treatment that starts at 13 units (the optimum) and extends until about 20 units
are reached. The similarity of the two distributions indicates that the effect of the label
(fu¨r Kinderkleidung, Spielsachen etc.). Das restliche Kindergeld geben Sie fu¨r eigene Zwecke (Hobbys etc.)
aus.”
14The exact wording was: ”Ich finde das Verhalten der Mu¨llers: (1) nicht gerechtfertigt, ... , (6) vo¨llig
gerechtfertigt.”
15The questionnaire included two other scenarios concerning (i) a person claiming student support
provided by the state although not being entitled to it, and (ii) a person temporarily claiming unemploy-
ment benefits although having a new job already on the horizon. The results for all three scenarios are
very similar. We therefore decided to focus on the child benefit scenario as it is closest to the decision in
the experiment.
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does not depend on subjects’ moral concerns. The treatment effect is 2.3 units in the
High-MO group (p = 0.059), whereas it is 2.1 units (p = 0.028) in the Low-MO group.
Thus, the effect is essentially the same in both groups. A regression analysis confirms this
result. Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3.2 include a dummy equal to one if a subject is in
the High-MO group and an interaction term between the label dummy and the High-MO
dummy. The reference category in these regressions is therefore the group of Low-MO
subjects in the Cash treatment. We find that, in contrast to the regressions in columns
(5) and (6), the coefficient on the label dummy remains large (2.1 units) and significant
at the 10%-level. This indicates that subjects having relatively weaker moral obligation
still exhibit a treatment effect that is very close to the overall treatment effect. Moreover,
the interaction term is small (0.2 units) and far from being significant, showing that the
treatment effect is basically the same in both groups.16 Taken together, these results are
not in line with the hypothesis that moral obligation drives the treatment effect in the
experiment.
3.3.4. Robustness Check: Distance from Optimum. The analysis we conducted
so far has concentrated on subjects’ choices regarding the absolute consumption level of
the subsidized good. To test the robustness of our findings, we now analyze an additional
measure of performance: the distance from the optimal consumption level. This allows
us to test whether the magnitude of the error subjects make depends on the form of the
subsidy.
The regression specifications are completely analogous to our earlier analysis. The
only difference is that the dependent variable is now the linear distance between subjects’
consumption choice and the optimal consumption level. Results are presented in Table 3.3.
Columns (1) and (2) show that in the reference stage distance to the optimal consumption
is virtually the same in both treatments. Subjects in the Label treatment are about 0.1
units further away from the optimum, which is not significant. In contrast, results from
the subsidy stage indicate that there is a large and significant treatment effect: consumers
in the Label treatment are about 1.9 units further away from the optimal consumption
level, see columns (3) and (4).
Concerning the relationship between math grades and the size of the treatment effect
estimates are very similar to the results presented so far. The treatment effect for the
High-Math group is small (0.4 units) and insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient on
16The answers to the two other vignettes are also not systematically related to the consumption of the
subsidized good. The same holds true if we take the average answer of each subject to the three vignettes
as our proxy for moral obligation.
3
.3
.
R
E
S
U
L
T
S
6
3
Table 3.3: Distance from Optimum in the Laboratory Experiment
Dependent Variable: distance from optimal consumption level (in units)
Reference Stage Subsidy Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 if Label Treatment 0.120 0.117 1.903*** 1.891*** 0.422 0.336 1.530* 1.505*
[0.334] [0.337] [0.667] [0.670] [0.882] [0.890] [0.873] [0.945]
1 if Low-Math Group -1.204 -1.351
[0.945] [0.961]
Label * Low-Math 3.204** 3.361**
[1.317] [1.333]
1 if High-MO Group -1.458 -1.422
[0.945] [0.962]
Label * High-MO 0.627 0.697
[1.352] [1.361]
Age -0.006 0.089 0.125 0.050
[0.058] [0.115] [0.114] [0.117]
1 if Female -0.327 0.704 0.633 0.695
[0.351] [0.698] [0.680] [0.696]
Constant 1.489*** 1.829 2.444*** -0.008 2.926*** -0.227 3.125*** 1.545
[0.238] [1.356] [0.474] [2.698] [0.598] [2.628] [0.646] [2.850]
N. Obs. 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
Prob > F 0.721 0.802 0.005 0.027 0.003 0.008 0.013 0.039
Adjusted R2 -0.010 -0.023 0.074 0.068 0.117 0.117 0.085 0.076
Table 3.3: Distance from Optimum in the Laboratory Experiment. OLS estimates, standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the
distance to the optimal consumption of the subsidized good. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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the interaction term is large (3.2 units) and significant at the 5%-level, see columns (5)
and (6). Finally, we analyze the impact of subjects’ moral concerns. The estimates are
shown in columns (7) and (8). As before, we include the moral obligation dummy and
its interaction with the label dummy in the regression. We find that the label dummy
remains sizeable (1.5 units) and significant at the 10%-level. This indicates that the
group of subjects with relatively weak moral obligation exhibits a substantial treatment
effect. The interaction term is small (0.7 units) and insignificant, indicating that subjects
with relatively high moral obligation exhibit a similar treatment effect. Thus, our earlier
findings are confirmed: also for the distance from the optimum, the label has a significant
impact on choices. Moreover, the treatment effect is significantly correlated with subjects’
math grades, whereas there is no such correlation for subjects’ attitudes towards moral
obligation.
3.4. Vignette Survey
In this section we report results from the vignette survey which we conducted as a
complement to the laboratory experiment. As in the experiment, we find a significant
treatment effect. This effect is much stronger for subjects with a relatively weak mathe-
matical background.
3.4.1. Design. The survey has the same general structure as the experiment. Par-
ticipants decide twice, in a reference stage and in a subsidy stage, and there are two
treatments, Cash treatment (CT) and Label treatment (LT). The survey presented par-
ticipants with a scenario (a vignette), in which the consumption decision was framed as
the search for a new apartment. In both stages, survey participants decided hypothetically
which of two apartments to rent, either a small and cheap one (250 Euro per month) or a
large and expensive one (410 Euro per month). In the reference stage, participants’ only
income source was a basic income of 900 Euro per month. In the subsidy stage, partici-
pants faced the same apartment choice again, now with their budget being increased by
an additional payment of 200 Euro per month. While the reference stage was exactly the
same in both treatments, the subsidy stage differed in the way the additional payment was
labeled: in the CT, participants’ initial budget was increased by a scholarship payment
of 200 Euro, whereas in the LT, their budget was increased by a housing subsidy of 200
Euro. The crucial feature of the design is that the housing subsidy is non-distortionary, as
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the amount of the payment is lower than the rent of either apartment. The participants
had to indicate for each monthly budget which apartment they would choose.17
We constructed the figures in the vignette to be close to actual average budgets and
rent expenditures of German students. According to a representative survey of the German
student population conducted on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research,
the average monthly income of a student is 823 Euro, and students who rent an apartment
pay a monthly rent of 300 Euro on average (Isserstedt, Middendorff, Weber, Schnitzer,
and Wolter 2004).18 Treatments were assigned randomly and nobody participated in more
than one treatment. Participants were students of the universities of Bonn and Cologne.
Overall, we collected the choices of 525 participants, 264 in the Cash treatment and 261
in the Label treatment. None of the participants took part in the laboratory experiment.
In addition to the apartment choices, we asked participants to indicate their age, gender,
and field of study.
3.4.2. Consumption Decisions. Results in the reference stage were very similar
across treatments. In the Cash treatment, 20.8% of participants chose the large apart-
ment, whereas this share was 23.8% in the Label treatment (p = 0.242, Fisher Exact
test).19 This finding indicates that the randomization process worked well: there is no
significant difference in the housing preferences of participants in either treatment. A pro-
bit regression confirms the result: in the reference stage, the treatment dummy is small
(0.029) and far from being significant (see columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.5).
Now we focus on outcomes of the subsidy stage. The main research question is whether
the form of the subsidy payment influences consumption decisions. If participants treat
the two income sources as fungible, the share of participants choosing the large apartment
should be identical across treatments. In contrast, if some participants violate fungibility,
we expect average housing consumption to be higher in the Label treatment. Choices in
the subsidy stage show that this is indeed the case.
Result 5: In the vignette survey, participants in the Label treatment chose the
large apartment significantly more often, compared to participants in the Cash
treatment.
17See Appendix C.2 for the precise wording of the questionnaire (translated from German).
18These figures refer to the average 26-year-old student in Germany. Among our survey participants,
average age is 26.8 years. As the price level in the Cologne-Bonn region is relatively high compared to the
rest of Germany, actual monthly income of students in our sample is likely to be higher than 823 Euro.
19Unless noted otherwise, all significance levels in this Section derive from two-sided Fisher Exact
tests.
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Table 3.4: GRE Test Scores (Quantitative Section)
Field of Study Mean GRE Score N. Obs.
Physics 744 35
Mathematical Sciences 733 6
Economics 706 26
Computer Sciences 704 51
Chemistry 696 46
Philosophy 636 5
Geology 630 11
Biology 615 51
Business 595 55
Geography 578 12
Foreign Languages 573 37
History 556 10
Medical Sciences 552 6
Sociology 545 11
Psychology 543 9
Law 539 85
Education 534 10
Communications 533 7
Table 3.4: GRE Test Scores (Quantitative Section). “Mean GRE Score” refers to the
mean score in the quantitative section of the GRE that test takers in the years 2001–2004
achieved, according to field of study. “N. Obs.” refers to the number of participants in our
sample who are enrolled in the respective field of study. For ease of exposition, only fields of
study with at least 5 observations are included in this table.
In the Cash treatment 51.5% of participants chose the large apartment, whereas in the
Label treatment 62.8% of participants did so. The difference is highly significant (p =
0.012). Again, this finding is confirmed by a probit regression. Columns (3) and (4) in
Table 3.5 report the results. We see that the label dummy is significant at the 5%-level,
the marginal effect is estimated to be 11.3 %-points. The coefficient remains virtually
unchanged when we control for age and gender.
Note that the estimates presented so far understate the effect of the label on consump-
tion choice, since a substantial share of participants chose the large apartment already in
the reference stage (approximately 22% of the sample). For these participants we cannot
observe whether the treatment manipulation has an effect on choices, as they cannot in-
crease their housing consumption further when having the larger budget in the subsidy
stage. To get a more precise picture of the impact of the subsidy, we now look at the
sample of participants who chose the small apartment in the reference stage (n = 408). In
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Table 3.5: Consumption in the Vignette Survey
Dependent Variable: 1 if large apartment is chosen
Reference Stage Subsidy Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if label treatment 0.029 0.030 0.113*** 0.108** -0.022 -0.020
[0.036] [0.037] [0.043] [0.043] [0.077] [0.077]
1 if low-math group -0.096 -0.097
[0.067] [0.067]
Label * low-math 0.217** 0.212**
[0.086] [0.087]
Age -0.002 0.001 0.002
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
1 if female 0.021 0.045 0.013
[0.039] [0.045] [0.049]
N. Obs. 525 523 525 523 498 497
Prob > χ2 0.4212 0.7478 0.009 0.057 0.003 0.017
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.020 0.020
Table 3.5: Consumption in the Vignette Survey. Probit estimation, marginal effects
evaluated at the mean with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 if participant
chooses the large apartment. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
this sample, 39.2% of participants in the CT switched to the large apartment in the sub-
sidy stage. In contrast, 52.7% of participants in the LT switched to the large apartment,
which implies that the label on the subsidy increased the probability to switch by 13.5
%-points. This marginal effect of 34.4% is highly significant (p = 0.008). The marginal
propensity to consume out of the subsidy jumps from 31.4% in the CT to 42.2% in the
LT.20 These numbers are also interesting from a public policy perspective, as they suggest
that the label on the housing subsidy leads to a substantial increase in the share of total
income that recipients are willing to spend on housing.21
3.4.3. Impact of Mathematical Ability. In the experiment, the treatment effect
was stronger among subjects with lower mathematical ability. The same is true for the
survey.
Result 6: In the vignette survey, the treatment effect is stronger for participants
with a relatively weak mathematical background.
20Switching from the small to the large apartment increases housing consumption by 160 Euro (410
Euro - 250 Euro), and the subsidy is worth 200 Euro.
21A precise estimate of this share is however difficult to obtain in our simple setup, as the housing
decision in the survey is a choice from only two options. It is not clear how participants would decide
if they were offered additional options where apartment size and apartment price are in the intermediate
range between the two options in the survey.
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To address whether the size of the treatment effect is correlated with mathematical ability,
we take the major field of study as a proxy for participants’ mathematical background. To
rank majors accordingly, we use data on the performance of test takers in the Graduate
Record Examination (GRE) Test.22 In the quantitative section of the GRE, test takers
have to answer a large number of mathematical questions in a short amount of time. As
a proxy for the participants’ mathematical background we use average quantitative GRE
scores of all test takers in the years 2001-2004, according to major field of study. Table
3.4 lists majors present among our participants ranked by GRE score. In order to divide
our sample into a High-Math group and a Low-Math group we perform a cluster analysis.
The results of this analysis point to a GRE of 680 as the optimal break point. This
cutoff leads to a High-Math group (n = 167) consisting of participants who study Physics,
Mathematics, Economics, Computer Science, and Chemistry. In contrast, the Low-Math
group (n = 331) consists of participants studying Philosophy, Geology, Biology, Business,
Geography, Languages, History, Medical Science, Sociology, Psychology, Law, Education,
and Communications.
Results for the High-Math group indicate that the share of participants who chose the
large apartment is 58.1% in the Cash treatment, whereas it is 55.9% in the Label treatment
(p = 0.890). These numbers suggest that participants in the High-Math group are not
affected by the treatment manipulation. In contrast, in the Low-Math group, 48.3% of
the participants chose the large apartment in the Cash treatment, whereas 68.4% did so
in the Label treatment (p = 0.001). Probit estimates confirm that the treatment effect
between the two groups is large and significant (see columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.5).
When we include the Low-Math dummy and its interaction with the Label dummy in the
regression, the Label dummy becomes small (-0.022) and insignificant. In contrast, the
coefficient on the interaction term is large (21.7 %-points) and significant at the 5%-level.
These results confirm that participants in the High-Math group do not exhibit a treatment
effect, whereas the treatment effect in the Low-Math group is substantial.
In sum, results from the vignette survey are very similar to results from the laboratory
experiment: we observe a sizeable labeling effect, indicating that many subjects do not act
in line with fungibility. Moreover, this effect is particularly strong among subjects with
relatively low mathematical skills. As the survey relied on participants’ actual housing
preferences, and as participants had only two options to choose from, these results indicate
22Prospective graduate students have to take the GRE test before applying to Ph.D. programs in the
U.S., the UK, or Canada. For details concerning the GRE test, see www.gre.org. Data was obtained from
ETS, the institution organizing the test.
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that even in a very natural and relatively simple environment, many people do not act in
line with fungibility.
3.5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter we have conducted an incentivized laboratory experiment and a ran-
domized vignette survey to test whether consumers treat different income sources as fun-
gible. Experiment and survey yield the same results: even in our simple setup, many
subjects do not act in line with fungibility. This effect is stronger for persons with lower
mathematical skills. Differences in preferences, e.g, concerning the moral obligation to
comply with the intention of the subsidy giver, do not drive our results.
An important application of our findings concerns the effect of housing benefits on
market rents. Empirical studies for the U.S. and for France have shown that a rise in
housing benefits for low-income tenants has lead to drastic rent increases (see, e.g., Susin
2002, Fack 2006).23 The standard explanation for this phenomenon is that the subsidy
causes an increase in housing demand which is met by an inelastic supply. In contrast,
our findings suggest that this is only part of the story. Taking our results at face value,
tenants who receive housing benefits are willing to spend a higher share of their budget on
housing, compared to tenants who receive the same amount as a cash grant. If landlords
anticipate this effect they are able to increase the rent accordingly. Laferre`re and Le Blanc
(2004) present evidence from France in support of this view: controlling for apartment
and neighborhood characteristics, landlords discriminate between non-assisted tenants and
tenants who receive housing assistance, charging the latter group significantly higher rents.
As a result, housing benefits do not necessarily make the recipients better off, but may
constitute a transfer payment from taxpayers to landlords. In our view, this problem can
be mitigated by linking housing benefits less saliently to rent payments. For instance, the
periodicity of benefit payments could be chosen such that it differs from the periodicity of
rent payments. Moreover, one could design the benefit system such that the exact amount
of the subsidy depends on variables which the landlord cannot observe.24
Due to the non-distortionary nature of the subsidy in our experiments, our findings
are also related to the study of unconditional transfer payments. The recipients of child
benefits, for instance, are not restricted in their use of these funds and only the name
23Similarly, Gibbons and Manning (2006) show for the U.K. that a reduction in housing benefits has
lead to lower rents.
24Similarly, housing benefits should be paid directly to the tenant and not to the landlord. In the
French housing benefit system, for example, the subsidy is often paid directly to the landlord. This might
additionally affect the bargaining process by creating a “moral property right” of the landlord (see Ga¨chter
and Riedl 2005).
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of the benefit payment marks it as a separate income component. Still, if recipients do
not treat money as fungible, they will spend the subsidy disproportionately on child-
related goods. Indeed, the effects we identify in the laboratory are also present in the
field: Kooreman (2000) analyzes data from the Netherlands and shows that the marginal
propensity to consume child clothing out of child benefits is much higher than it is out of
other income.25 Munro (2005) finds that the unconditional “winter fuel allowance” in the
UK has a positive effect on heating expenditures. Taken together, our results demonstrate
in a controlled environment that many consumers tend to comply with the label attached
to a subsidy. Public policy can therefore influence consumption behavior in a simple way
by explicitly stating the intended use of a transfer payment. However, whether the policy
maker’s goal to raise recipients’ consumption of the subsidized good is reached depends
crucially on the market environment at hand. Spending a higher share of one’s budget on
a good only translates into higher consumption if the price of the good does not increase
by too much.
Our results do not imply that everybody in every situation will violate fungibility. In
our study, treating money as non-fungible is linked to cognitive ability and not to pref-
erences, suggesting that this behavior is a mistake.26 Once the rational solution becomes
obvious to subjects, e.g., by learning, they will probably regret their decision and choose
the optimal solution. Moffitt (1989) studies the food stamps program in Puerto Rico and
finds no difference between (non-distortionary) in-kind benefits and cash grants. People
in his study had considerable experience with food stamps and were apparently able to
learn the rational behavior. By contrast, most people make only a few housing decisions
in their life; here, the scope for non-rational behavior is likely to be larger.
25However, Blow, Walker, and Zhu (2004) analyze data from the U.K. and find such a labeling effect
only for some of their specifications.
26Note that our subject pool consisted exclusively of university students, so it is safe to assume that
our subjects have higher cognitive skills than the population average. Since results were stronger for
subjects with lower cognitive ability, we probably underestimate the true effect.
CHAPTER 4
Who Reacts to Monetary Incentives? The Role of Extrinsic
and Intrinsic Motivation among Volunteer Workers
4.1. Introduction
Many people contribute to society’s welfare without receiving any financial compensa-
tion for it: for instance, they give money to charity, they donate blood, or they volunteer
their time and their work effort.1 An area of particular interest in this context is the
involvement of senior citizens in prosocial activities. Most OECD countries are facing
the demographic phenomenon of aging societies. In order to mitigate the loss of human
capital that ensues when elderly workers leave the workforce, public policy might want to
encourage senior citizens to stay active as volunteers and transmit their skills and know-
how to the younger generations. From a policy perspective, it is therefore important to
understand how the level of public-spirited behavior is influenced by the environment in
which people interact. In particular, a crucial question is whether monetary incentives are
a valid instrument to foster prosocial behavior.
Economic research has offered contradicting views on the consequences of introduc-
ing monetary incentives into non-monetary environments. According to standard theory,
introducing monetary rewards should lead to a (weakly) higher supply of the desired
activity. In contrast, it has been suggested that there are circumstances under which ma-
terial rewards have a detrimental effect on behavior. In a seminal paper, Titmuss (1970)
argued that offering monetary compensation to blood donors might actually reduce the
total supply of blood donated.2 In a similar vein, a literature on the so called “moti-
vation crowding-out” phenomenon assumes that the introduction of extrinsic incentives
destroys intrinsic motivation (for a survey, see Frey and Jegen 2001). An influential paper
by Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) has provided a theoretical explanation for the potentially
detrimental effect of monetary rewards by analyzing a model that combines people’s con-
cerns for their reputation with heterogeneity in individual responsiveness to extrinsic and
intrinsic incentives.
1Freeman (1997) has pioneered the empirical analysis of volunteering behavior.
2For a critical comment on this hypothesis, see Arrow (1972).
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In this chapter, we empirically analyze the effect of an introduction of monetary pay-
ments on the labor supply of volunteers. We use a unique data set that allows us to
investigate directly the role of individual heterogeneity with respect to extrinsic and in-
trinsic motivation. The data set contains observations on more than 500 volunteers who
work for a charitable organization in Germany. The volunteers are retired professionals
who continue to work in their old job as unpaid consultants for small and medium-sized
firms, often in developing countries. In the main survey question, respondents had to
indicate their labor supply response if they were offered monetary rewards. In particu-
lar, they had to indicate how their willingness to work would change if they were offered
payments of 100 Euro, 500 Euro, and 1000 Euro per week, respectively. The proxies for
respondents’ intrinsic and extrinsic motives are elicited via simple personality questions.
To proxy for the degree to which participants are motivated by intrinsic factors, they were
asked how important it is for them to “be there for others”. This question captures the
essence of public-spirited behavior, where a person cares not only about herself, but also
about her contribution to others’ well-being. In contrast, the role of extrinsic sources of
motivation is proxied by asking respondents how important it is for them to “be able to
afford things”. With this question we can identify the degree of importance respondents
attach to material goods. Note that, while our approach relies on hypothetical survey
data, it still gives us the advantage that we can elicit behavior that would be extremely
difficult to obtain with field data. In particular, we are able to construct a labor supply
schedule for a large number of volunteers who are being offered financial payments. Our
work is therefore a complement to empirical studies with field data.
Our study yields three main results. First, we find that a large majority of the respon-
dents acts in line with standard economic theory: 84% of the respondents would react to
the introduction of financial incentives with a (weak) increase in their labor supply. In
contrast, the prevalence of crowding-out is rather low, as only a relatively small share of
respondents would work less when financial incentives were introduced. Second, we show
that the degree to which workers are motivated by extrinsic factors has a decisive impact
on their reaction to the introduction of financial incentives. Our results indicate that
volunteers who score high in the extrinsic proxy do indeed react to the introduction of
financial incentives by working more than the other volunteers. Furthermore, the degree
to which intrinsic factors matter to the volunteers has the opposite effect: intrinsically
motivated people tend to show a weaker reaction to financial incentives than their coun-
terparts. Thus, two simple personality measures help to predict how individuals are going
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to adjust their work effort in response to financial incentives. The third result reveals
that the differences in labor supply we find on the aggregate level are mostly driven by
a crowding-in effect that affects the workers disproportionately. Volunteers who are mo-
tivated by extrinsic factors are significantly more likely to be crowded-in when they are
offered money for their work. The effect is large and significant, with a unit increase in the
extrinsic proxy corresponding to an increase in the probability of being crowded in by 6%-
points, with a baseline probability of 23.8% at the medium payment level. Moreover, also
the degree of intrinsic motivation affects the crowding-in of labor supply. Our estimates
show that a unit increase in the intrinsic proxy implies a reduction in the probability of
being crowded-in by 8%-points. Thus, we find strong evidence indicating that intrinsically
motivated volunteers are more likely to keep their work load constant, even when being
offered large monetary payments. When analyzing the crowding-out of labor supply, nei-
ther extrinsic nor intrinsic motives have a significant impact on the volunteers’ decision.
This is not surprising as only very few volunteers would reduce their labor supply due to
the introduction of financial incentives.
Robustness checks show that our results continue to hold when using an alternative
measure that addresses the concern that different respondents might use different scales
when rating how important extrinsic and intrinsic factors are to them. We construct a
very simple within-person measure: volunteers to whom being able to afford things is more
important than being there for others are categorized as “extrinsic”, volunteers for whom
the opposite is true are categorized as “intrinsic”, and volunteers to whom both factors
are of equal importance are categorized as “neutral”. This alternative measure therefore
relies only on the assumption that a respondent uses the same scale when answering each
of the two questions. Using these category dummies in labor supply regressions that are
otherwise identical to our earlier analysis demonstrates that the “extrinsic” dummy is
positive and significant, whereas the “intrinsic” dummy is negative and significant, with
“neutral” being the reference category.
In sum, our study provides evidence that the effect of financial incentives on public-
spirited behavior depends crucially on the behavioral motives of the volunteers. High
degrees of intrinsic motivation correspond to a low responsiveness to financial incentives.
In contrast, high degrees of extrinsic motivation are related to behavior in accordance with
standard economic theory, where workers increase their labor supply when offered mone-
tary rewards. Thus, in the setting we investigate, the introduction of financial incentives
leads to a disproportionate crowding-in of extrinsically motivated workers.
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The low overall prevalence of crowding-out in our sample is in line with Prendergast
(1999), who reviews the empirical evidence on the effects of financial incentives in labor
contexts. Regarding the idea of material incentives destroying intrinsic motivation he ar-
gues that “while this idea holds some intuitive appeal, it should be noted that there is little
conclusive empirical evidence (particularly in workplace settings) of these influences”.3 In
contrast, evidence on the negative effect of financial rewards is often derived from the con-
text of charitable activities. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show in controlled experiments
that people’s work effort in a task where monetary rewards are absent is significantly
higher than it is in exactly the same task with low, performance-contingent payments. In
particular, the task used in some of their experiments was to collect money for a charitable
organization. A recent blood donation experiment by Mellstro¨m and Johannesson (2005)
has demonstrated a negative effect of financial rewards on the blood donation rate.
Our findings point to a fundamental difference between public-spirited deeds such as
donating blood or collecting money on the one hand, and deeds such as the provision of
volunteer labor on the other. Collecting money or donating blood could be considered
rather dull or even painful activities that do not generate an immediate utility gain for
the volunteer. Therefore, the utility derived from these activities lies probably in the rep-
utational benefits associated with them. In contrast, for volunteers who work in activities
that are inherently satisfactory, one may be hard pressed to argue that they decrease their
involvement as soon as financial incentives are introduced. Thus, for activities such as
volunteer work in a task that is both interesting and inherently satisfactory (e.g., volun-
teer work within the old job, as it is the case in our sample), the research focus should
be rather on the question whether people keep their work load constant as opposed to
working more.
In the related literature, several recent experiments have analyzed the interplay of
financial incentives and reputational concerns. Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2007) analyze
both a lab experiment and a field experiment in which people have to perform a real
effort task in order to earn money for a charity. In the experiment, subjects work either
paid or unpaid and either in a public setting or in a private setting. The results show
that, when working without rewards for a good cause (American Red Cross), subjects put
forth significantly more effort in the public condition than in the private condition. More-
over, introducing rewards leads to a significant increase in effort in the private condition,
whereas it has no effect in the public condition. Linardi and McConnell (2008) analyze a
3See also Lazear (2000) who provides extensive empirical evidence on the positive effects of monetary
incentives in labor contexts.
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very similar setup in which subjects work for a charitable organization under controlled
laboratory conditions. Again, subjects work either paid or unpaid and either in a public
setting or in a private setting. All effects are qualitatively similar to Ariely, Bracha, and
Meier (2007), albeit on a lower magnitude. Closest to our study is a paper by Carpenter
and Myers (2007) who investigate field data on the volunteer behavior of firefighters in
Vermont. The data set includes proxies for individuals’ degree of altruism and reputa-
tional concerns. The results show that the decision to volunteer is highly correlated with
altruistic motives and with reputational concerns. Moreover, it is shown that the positive
effect of financial rewards declines with peoples’ reputational concerns, which is in line
with the hypothesis that extrinsic incentives can crowd out prosocial behavior.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 gives an overview
of the theoretical background that informs our empirical analysis, Section 4.3 describes
the survey design. The empirical results are presented in Section 4.4, while Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2. Theoretical Background
In order to predict the effect of financial rewards on behavior, a number of theories
might be relevant for the setting we investigate. According to standard economic theory,
agents who decide whether to carry out a certain task face a simple tradeoff: they choose
to carry out the task only if the benefits from it are higher than the cost. In a labor market
setting this would imply that, e.g., workers accept a job only if the rewards are higher than
the cost that is caused by the work effort. Similarly, it seems plausible that people who
volunteer derive non-monetary utility from their volunteer work that makes it worthwile
to carry out this activity. Therefore, standard theory offers a clear prediction regarding
the effect of financial rewards: the introduction of financial payments for a certain activity
should always have a (weakly) positive effect. If it was attractive to carry out an activity
in the absence of rewards, it should become even more attractive to do so if a reward is
introduced.
Early studies on the potentially detrimental effects of monetary payments emerged
from the field of cognitive psychology. Researchers following Deci (1971) have found that
the introduction and subsequent removal of material incentives can undermine intrinsic
motivation for a task as soon as the reward is being removed.4 The so-called cognitive
evaluation theory (CET) predicts that tangible rewards undermine intrinsic motivation if
4A comprehensive meta-analysis reviewing 128 empirical studies is provided by Deci, Koestner, and
Ryan (1999), another survey article is Ryan and Deci (2000).
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they are made contingent on task performance. In economics it has been suggested that
the detrimental effect of financial incentives is rooted in the preferences of individuals:
some people may just dislike being paid for an activity that they were ready to carry
out for intrinsic reasons in the first place (Frey and Jegen 2001). In this framework,
two opposing effects operate as soon as financial incentives are introduced: on the one
hand, a price effect makes the activity under study more attractive; on the other, intrinsic
motivation suffers from the introduction of explicit incentives. The overall prediction for
observed behavior is then ambiguous, as it depends on the relative strength of the two
effects.
A recent paper by Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) has suggested that the detrimental effect
of monetary incentives might result from people’s reputational concerns. In their model,
agents decide whether to engage in a prosocial activity. Agents’ utility function consists of
three components: a valuation for behaving in a public-spirited way (intrinsic motivation),
a valuation for material rewards (extrinsic motivation), and a concern for having a pro-
social reputation. The reputational concerns are such that agents wish to be perceived
as having a high valuation for public-spirited behavior and as having a low valuation for
material rewards. The agents’ types are private information, such that a signal-extraction
environment arises: by observing the degree to which a person engages in the prosocial
activity, the other agents can draw inferences about the person’s “altruism” and “greed”,
respectively. In the equilibrium of this model, the introduction of monetary rewards creates
doubts about the true motive for which people engage in public-spirited activities, which
can lead to a crowding-out of prosocial behavior through extrinsic incentives.5 While our
data set is not rich enough to capture all the parameters that are relevant in the elaborate
setting of Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), our empirical analysis still accounts for the idea that
volunteers are heterogenous with respect to their responsiveness to extrinsic and intrinsic
incentives.
4.3. Survey Design
The data were collected via a survey among volunteers who work for the Senior Expert
Service (SES), a non-profit organization in Germany. The SES sends retired professionals
on assignments both in Germany and abroad. Typically, these “Senior Experts” share their
5Seabright (2004) and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) have proposed related models that address
the interplay of financial incentives and altruistic motives, but neither of these studies takes the two-
dimensional heterogeneity of people with respect to their degree of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation into
account. Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) have explored the impact of extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation in a
model with an informed principal, where the agent has to perform a task and where the principal has
private information on the agent’s ability for this task.
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Table 4.1: Sample Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max N. Obs.
age 65.489 4.477 66 45 77 583
female 0.073 0.261 0 0 1 587
log(hours) 2.441 0.741 2.708 1.609 3.555 579
log(income) 8.027 0.491 8.006 6.214 10.309 533
be able to afford things 2.696 0.674 3 1 4 570
be there for others 3.088 0.575 3 1 4 578
Table 4.1: Sample Statistics. The variable log(hours) is the natural logarithm of the average
hours the respondent works per week when being on an assignment for the SES. The variable
log(income) is the natural logarithm of the net household income per month. The variable being
able to afford things is derived from a question that asked participants how important it is for
them to be able to afford things. Answers ranged from 1 (=not important) to 4 (=very
important). The variable be there for others is defined analogously.
professional experience with small and medium sized companies, mostly in the fields of
industrial production and infrastructure, but also in trade and agriculture. The experts do
not receive remuneration for their work. Travel and accommodation costs are borne either
by the client or by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, in
case the client is unable to cover these costs. In 2005, Senior Experts were sent to a total of
1,477 assignments, most of them in Europe (42%), Asia (40%), and Latin America (9%).
The average duration of assignments in developing and emerging countries was five weeks,
whereas it was about three weeks for assignments in Europe.6 The survey was mailed out
in November 2004 to 750 Senior Experts who had at least one assignment in the time
period between January and August 2004. We obtained 587 answers, which corresponds
to a response rate of 78.3%. This response rate is very high, indicating that the volunteers
take their work for SES seriously.
The main questions in the survey confronted respondents with an introduction of
financial incentives to the non-monetary environment they are working in. Participants
had to indicate how they would adjust their work effort for three different payment levels:
100 Euro per week, 500 Euro per week, and 1000 Euro per week. The question read: “How
would your willingness to work for the SES change compared to the current situation if
you were paid 100 Euro [500 Euro; 1000 Euro] per week of assignment?”. Participants
answered on a scale from 1 (“I would stop working for the SES”) to 5 (“I would definitely
want to work more”).7 These questions provide us with a direct measure of respondents’
6For more information, see SES (2005) and the SES webpage at www.ses-bonn.de.
7For the original wording of the questions (in German), see questions 43-45 in Appendix D.
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reaction to the introduction of monetary incentives. In addition, the survey asked for socio-
demographic background variables such as age, gender, and monthly household income.
To measure the impact of extrinsic and intrinsic factors on the volunteers’ labor supply
decision, the survey contained two personality-related questions. In order to proxy the
degree to which respondents are motivated by extrinsic incentives, they were asked: “How
important is it for you to be able to afford things?”. In contrast, a proxy for the degree to
which intrinsic motivation matters for the respondent was obtained through the question:
“How important is it for you to be there for others?”. Participants answered on a scale
from 1 (“not important”) to 4 (“very important”).8 The survey was constructed such
that these proxies were obtained together with a total of ten personality-related questions
about, e.g., the importance of owning a house, of having a happy marriage, and of having
children. This design was chosen in order to minimize the probability that participants
establish a connection between the two personality questions of interest and the question
about adjusting their labor supply in face of monetary incentives.
An overview of the sample statistics is given in Table 4.1. The median age in the
sample is 66 years. The share of women is 7.3%, reflecting the fact that professionals in
the fields in which SES is active are predominantly male. The median of hours worked
during an assignment is 15 hours per week. The median net household income of the
volunteers in our sample is 3,000 Euro per month. Regarding the measure for extrinsic
motivation, the average answer of respondents is 2.7, with a standard deviation of 0.674.
The average answer for the intrinsic motivation measure is slightly higher, at 3.1, with
a standard deviation of 0.575. Histograms of the two measures are shown in Figure 4.1.
The upper graph shows the distribution of the extrinsic proxy. A share of 8.4% of the
participants finds it very important to be able to afford things, and 56.5% find it important.
In contrast, 31.4% indicate that being able to afford things is less important to them, and
to 3.7% it is not important at all. The lower graph shows the distribution of the proxy
for intrinsic motivation. A share of 20.4% of the volunteers finds it very important to be
there for others, while 68.9% find it important. The share of participants finding it less
important is 9.9% and only 0.9% find it not important at all.
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Labor Supply Decision. In a first step, we analyze volunteers’ individual
labor supply schedules (see Table 4.2). Most respondents (51.0%) keep their labor supply
unchanged for all three payment levels. Moreover, 15.0% do not react to the lowest
8For the original wording of the questions (in German), see question 12 in Appendix D.
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Figure 4.1: Proxies for Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation. Upper graph shows
histogram of answers to the question “How important is it for you to be able to afford things?”
Lower graph shows histogram of answers to the question “How important is it for you to be there
for others?” Answers are coded as follows: 1=“not important”, 2=“less important”,
3=“important”, 4=“very important”.
payment but would work more when offered the medium or the highest payment, while
11.7% of the respondents would keep their labor supply constant for the low payment and
the medium payment and would only work more if offered the high payment of 1000 Euro
per week. Finally, 6.6% of the respondents would work more for all payment levels, even
for the low payment of 100 Euro. Taken together, these findings suggest that for about 4
out of 5 respondents (84.3%) the introduction of financial payments leads to a (weakly)
higher labor supply. In contrast, the occurrence of crowding-out due to the introduction of
financial payments is much less frequent. The most common pattern is that crowding-out
occurs at the medium and/or at the high payment level (5.9% and 3.5%, respectively).
Only 1.4% of the respondents would reduce their labor supply for all payment levels. These
findings are captured in our first result:
Result 1 (Payment Levels and Labor Supply): A large majority of the
sample acts in line with standard economic theory: the introduction of financial
payments leads for about 84% of the respondents to a (weakly) higher labor supply.
In comparison, crowding-out of labor supply is observed only for a relatively small
share of the respondents.
80 4. WHO REACTS TO MONETARY INCENTIVES?
Table 4.2: Labor Supply Schedule
Weekly payment: N. Obs.
100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro
Labor supply: unchanged unchanged unchanged 292 (51.0%)
unchanged work more work more 86 (15.0%)
unchanged unchanged work more 67 (11.7%)
work more work more work more 38 (6.6%)
unchanged work less work less 34 (5.9%)
unchanged unchanged work less 20 (3.5%)
work more unchanged unchanged 11 (1.9%)
work less work less work less 8 (1.4%)
unchanged work more unchanged 4 (0.7%)
work more work more unchanged 4 (0.7%)
unchanged work more work less 3 (0.5%)
work less unchanged unchanged 2 (0.3%)
Table 4.2: Labor Supply Schedule. This table shows the within-person labor supply
schedule for all three payment levels, sorted by the number of observations in each cell. For ease
of exposition, “work less” consists of answers 1 (=stop working) and 2 (=tend to work less) and
“work more” consists of answers 4 (=tend to work more) and 5 (=definitely work more).
Schedules chosen only by a single respondent are not shown (4 observations in total).
A closer look at the data reveals that respondents’ labor supply differs sharply according
to whether the offered payment is either high or low. When faced with the low payment
of 100 Euro per week, a large majority of the respondents (88.3%) would keep their labor
supply unchanged, and 10.0% of the sample would work more (Figure 4.2). Evidence
on a crowding-out effect at this payment level is very weak, as only 1.7% of the sample
would work less than before. For higher payment levels, a quite different picture emerges:
an increase in the offered payment to 500 Euro per week and to 1000 Euro per week
leads to an increase in both the crowding-in and the crowding-out of work effort. The
share of respondents who would work more than before increases to 23.8% (500 Euro) and
33.5% (1000 Euro), whereas the share of respondents who would work less than in the
case of a zero wage increases to 7.4% (500 Euro) and to 11.6% (1000 Euro). The finding
of crowding-out especially at high levels of payment is a puzzling phenomenon that is
at odds with the existing theories of prosocial behavior. These theories typically predict
crowding-out to be highest at low payment levels, where the loss of reputation is large and
the wage payment is too low to compensate for this loss. Thus, it seems difficult to find
an explanation for our findings in light of the theory. One might speculate that this result
is based on the preferences of the volunteers in our sample: it could be that the volunteers
who are crowded out have a specific notion of what constitutes an appropriate payment for
their work. If these volunteers consider a payment of 100 Euro per week as appropriate,
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Figure 4.2: Labor Supply in Response to Monetary Payments. Histograms of the
labor supply in response to the introduction of a payment of 100 Euro, 500 Euro, and 1000 Euro
per week, respectively. Answers are coded as follows: 1=stop working, 2=tend to work less,
3=unchanged, 4=tend to work more, 5= definitely work more.
whereas higher payments of 500 and 1000 Euro are considered to be inappropriately high,
a pattern similar to the pattern in our data might arise.
Next, we address the interplay between the introduction of financial incentives and the
volunteers’ behavioral motives. We use regression analysis to assess whether the impact
of extrinsic and intrinsic motivational factors on a person’s labor supply decision is statis-
tically significant, controlling for background characteristics. Results of an ordered probit
regression are presented in Table 4.3. The dependent variable is the respondents’ labor
supply decision. Control variables are age, gender, current hours worked and household
income. We estimate separate regressions for the payment levels of 100, 500, and 1000
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Table 4.3: Labor Supply and Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation
Dependent Variable: Labor Supply
Payment: 100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro 100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
be able to 0.123 0.138* 0.151** 0.070 0.115 0.148**
afford things [0.098] [0.076] [0.071] [0.104] [0.079] [0.073]
be there 0.009 -0.168* -0.147* -0.088 -0.206** -0.189**
for others [0.112] [0.087] [0.083] [0.121] [0.091] [0.086]
age -0.019 -0.011 -0.000 -0.013 -0.005 0.010
[0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.016] [0.012] [0.011]
female -0.580** -0.297 -0.420** -0.605* -0.232 -0.319
[0.283] [0.206] [0.194] [0.325] [0.223] [0.208]
log(hours) -0.046 0.010 -0.026 -0.100 0.011 -0.031
[0.088] [0.069] [0.064] [0.097] [0.074] [0.069]
log(income) -0.516*** -0.142 0.043
[0.155] [0.111] [0.104]
N. Obs. 550 546 546 502 498 498
Prob > χ2 0.093 0.051 0.010 0.013 0.110 0.021
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.011 0.011 0.035 0.011 0.012
Table 4.3: Labor Supply and Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation). Ordered probit
estimates, standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted
by ***, **, and *, respectively. The dependent variable is the respondents’ labor supply on a
scale from 1 to 5, derived from a question that asked participants how their willingness to work
would change if they were offered a payment of either 100 Euro, or 500 Euro, or 1000 Euro (per
week). Answers are coded as follows: 1=stop working, 2=tend to work less, 3=unchanged,
4=tend to work more, 5= definitely work more. The variable be able to afford things is derived
from a question that asked participants how important it is for them to be able to afford things.
Answers ranged from 1 (=not important) to 4 (=very important). The variable be there for
others is defined analogously. The variable log(hours) is the natural logarithm of the average
hours the respondent works per week when being on an assignment for the SES. The variable
log(income) is the natural logarithm of the net household income per month.
Euro. For each payment level, two different specifications are estimated, with and without
a control for household income.
The estimation results show that the proxy for being extrinsically motivated has pos-
itive coefficients in all specifications. However, only 3 out of 6 coefficients are statistically
significant at conventional levels. The weakest results obtain for the 100 Euro payment
setting, where the coefficient is never significant, see columns (1) and (4). In contrast,
the strongest results are found for the 1000 Euro payment setting, where the coefficient
is significant at the 5%-level even if we control for household income, see column (6).
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Turning to the proxy for intrinsic motivation, we find again that coefficients are small
and insignificant in the 100 Euro setting. In contrast, for the 500 Euro and 1000 Euro
settings, all 4 coefficients are negative and significant at the 5%-level and the 10%-level,
respectively. Taken together, these findings lead to the following result:
Result 2 (The Role of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation): Volunteers to
whom extrinsic sources of motivation are important react to the introduction of fi-
nancial incentives by working more than the other volunteers. In contrast, volunteers
to whom intrinsic sources of motivation are important tend to offer less labor than
the other volunteers. These findings are more pronounced the higher the amount of
the financial incentives is.
Note that in the 100 Euro payment setting, the control for household income is highly
significant (column (4)). Thus, when offered 100 Euro per week, labor supply by richer
people is lower than labor supply by poorer people. This finding is reassuring, as it is in line
with the standard assumption of a diminishing marginal utility of money. In contrast, the
income measure has no explanatory power for the higher payments of 500 and 1000 Euro.
This indicates that respondents’ reaction to relatively high levels of payment is independent
of their financial background. The control variables age and current amount of hours
worked have no impact on the reaction towards the introduction of financial incentives.
The coefficient of the gender dummy is however negative and marginally significant in
some of the specifications. This finding is in line with the empirical study by Mellstro¨m
and Johannesson (2005): in their field experiment on blood donations, crowding-out of
prosocial behavior was observed only among women.
4.4.2. Crowding-in vs. Crowding-out. The findings we have obtained so far could
in principle come from different underlying sources. For instance, in line with the moti-
vation crowding-out literature, one group of people might find it optimal to reduce their
work effort when facing monetary incentives, whereas others do not (Frey and Jegen 2001).
On the other hand, it might as well be that one group of people keeps their work effort
constant, whereas others choose to work more. To discriminate between different explana-
tions for the overall labor supply outcome, we investigate the effect of financial incentives
and motivational measures separately according to whether we observe a crowding-in or
a crowding-out of labor supply in the data.
The crowding-in effect is analyzed in Table 4.4. We estimate probit regressions with
the dependent variable being equal to one if the respondent chooses to work more in face
of financial incentives, and zero otherwise. The regressions include the proxies for intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation and the same control variables as before. Again, we find that for
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Table 4.4: Crowding-in and Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation
Dependent Variable: Crowding-In (1= work more, 0=otherwise)
Payment: 100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro 100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
be able to 0.010 0.063** 0.069** 0.005 0.060** 0.069**
afford things [0.020] [0.029] [0.032] [0.019] [0.029] [0.032]
be there 0.000 -0.074** -0.087** -0.012 -0.080** -0.098***
for others [0.022] [0.032] [0.036] [0.022] [0.033] [0.038]
age -0.005* -0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.008
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
female -0.077 -0.074 -0.102 -0.073 -0.041 -0.042
[0.031] [0.070] [0.079] [0.030] [0.078] [0.091]
log(hours) -0.007 0.018 -0.022 -0.009 0.031 -0.006
[0.017] [0.026] [0.028] [0.018] [0.027] [0.030]
log(income) -0.067** -0.019 0.064
[0.029] [0.040] [0.046]
N. Obs. 550 546 546 502 498 498
Prob > χ2 0.184 0.038 0.010 0.173 0.075 0.012
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.028 0.021 0.026
Table 4.4: Crowding-in and Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation. Probit estimates,
marginal effects evaluated at the mean with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are
marginal effects. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *,
respectively. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent’s willingness
to work is higher when offered a payment of either 100 Euro, or 500 Euro, or 1000 Euro (per
week). The remaining variables are defined as in Table 4.3.
the payment of 100 Euro the motivational proxies are not significant. In the 500 Euro and
1000 Euro regressions, a different picture emerges: here, both motivational proxies are
highly significant. The extrinsic proxy has a positive coefficient, and the marginal effect
indicates that a unit increase in the extrinsic proxy is equivalent to an increase in the
probability of crowding-in to occur of between 6.0%-points and 6.9%-points. Recall that
the baseline probability for crowding-in to occur at these payment levels is 23.8% (500
Euro) and 33.5% (1000 Euro). Next, we turn to the proxy for intrinsic motivation. The
estimates are negative and significant in the 500 Euro and 1000 Euro regressions for all
specifications. Thus, volunteers with high levels of intrinsic motivation are less likely to be
crowded-in by financial incentives. The marginal effect indicates that for a unit increase
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in the intrinsic proxy, the reduction in the probability of crowding-in is between 7.4%-
points and 9.8%-points. Finally, we are going to address the crowding-out of labor supply
due to the introduction of financial incentives. We find for all payment levels that the
motivational proxies do not have any significant effects (regressions not reported). This
is likely due to the fact that we have overall only very few observations of crowding-out
in the sample, as described in Section 4.4.1. These findings are summarized in the next
result:
Result 3 (Crowding-in vs. Crowding-out): The crowding-in of labor supply
is higher among those volunteers who tend to be more extrinsically motivated than
others. A unit increase in the extrinsic measure corresponds approximately to a 6%-
points increase in the probability of crowding-in to occur. In contrast, volunteers who
are more intrinsically motivated than others are less likely to be crowded-in. A unit
increase in the measure for intrinsic motivation corresponds approximately to a 8%-
points decrease in the probability of crowding-in to occur. Regarding the crowding-out
of labor supply, neither the degree of extrinsic motivation nor the degree of intrinsic
motivation has a significant impact on volunteers’ decisions.
Taken together, our findings have shown that the variation we found in the analysis of
total labor supply is not due to disproportionate crowding-out, but due to a crowding-
in effect that affects separate subsets of the volunteers in different ways. In particular,
extrinsically motivated volunteers are significantly more likely to work more when offered
financial payments. In contrast, intrinsically motivated volunteers are significantly more
likely to keep their work load unchanged, even if they are offered substantial financial
payments.
4.4.3. A Within-Person Measure of Motivation. The results presented in the
previous subsection relied implicitly on the assumption that all respondents were using
the same ordinal scale when answering the personality questions. In this section we relax
this assumption by constructing a very simple within-person measure of extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation which relies solely on the relative weight people give to being able
to afford things compared to being there for others. This new measure sorts respondents
into three separate categories: it takes the value “extrinsic” for people to whom the ability
to afford things is more important than being there for others, the value “neutral” if the
two proxies have the same level of importance for the respective person, and the value
“intrinsic” if being there for others is more important than the ability to afford things.
The only assumption needed is therefore that the scale is the same within respondents
when answering each of the two questions.
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Table 4.5: Labor Supply (Within-person Measure)
Dependent Variable: Labor Supply
Payment: 100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro 100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if extrinsic 0.141 0.218 0.414*** 0.110 0.239 0.445***
[0.213] [0.165] [0.157] [0.234] [0.176] [0.168]
1 if intrinsic -0.027 -0.221** -0.090 -0.060 -0.221** -0.110
[0.138] [0.107] [0.100] [0.151] [0.112] [0.105]
age -0.021 -0.012 -0.001 -0.013 -0.006 0.009
[0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.016] [0.012] [0.011]
female -0.602** -0.332 -0.473** -0.639** -0.272 -0.381*
[0.280] [0.204] [0.192] [0.322] [0.220] [0.205]
log(hours) -0.052 0.018 -0.024 -0.103 0.021 -0.030
[0.088] [0.069] [0.064] [0.098] [0.074] [0.069]
log(income) -0.519*** -0.142 0.038
[0.154] [0.111] [0.104]
N. Obs. 550 546 546 502 498 498
Prob > χ2 0.137 0.026 0.003 0.015 0.075 0.008
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.034 0.012 0.014
Table 4.5: Labor Supply and Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation (Within-person).
Ordered probit estimates, standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The dependent variable is the respondents’ labor
supply, derived from a question that asked participants how their willingness to work would
change if they were offered a payment of either 100 Euro, or 500 Euro, or 1000 Euro (per week).
Answers are coded as follows: 1=stop working, 2=tend to work less, 3=unchanged, 4=tend to
work more, 5=definitely work more. The variable extrinsic is a dummy equal to one if the
respondent rated the importance of being able to afford things higher than the importance of
being there for others. The variable intrinsic is a dummy equal to one if the respondent rated the
importance of being able to afford things lower than the importance of being there for others.
The omitted category is neutral, consisting of the respondents who rated both factors as equally
important. The variable log(hours) is the natural logarithm of the average hours the respondent
works per week when being on an assignment for the SES. The variable log(income) is the
natural logarithm of the net household income per month.
According to this measure, in the total sample 63 respondents (11.1%) are classified as
extrinsic, whereas 267 (47.1%) are neutral, and 237 (41.8%) are intrinsic. In the following
we estimate ordered probit regressions with the dependent variable indicating the labor
supply response. The control variables are the same as before. The only difference to
our earlier analysis is that the motivational measures are now replaced by two dummies:
“extrinsic” is equal to one if the respondent falls into the category extrinsic (defined above)
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Table 4.6: Crowding-in (Within-person Measure)
Dependent Variable: Crowding-In (1=work more, 0=otherwise)
Payment: 100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro 100 Euro 500 Euro 1000 Euro
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if extrinsic 0.010 0.092 0.142** 0.011 0.116* 0.158**
[0.043] [0.066] [0.072] [0.045] [0.071] [0.076]
1 if intrinsic -0.008 -0.089** -0.074* -0.014 -0.084** -0.078*
[0.027] [0.038] [0.043] [0.027] [0.040] [0.045]
age -0.005** -0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.007
[0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
female -0.077** -0.087 -0.124* -0.074** -0.057 -0.069
[0.030] [0.066] [0.075] [0.029] [0.074] [0.087]
log(hours) -0.007 0.021 -0.020 -0.008 0.033 -0.005
[0.017] [0.026] [0.028] [0.018] [0.027] [0.030]
log(income) -0.067** -0.019 0.063
[0.028] [0.040] [0.045]
N. Obs. 550 546 546 502 498 498
Prob > χ2 0.190 0.029 0.010 0.169 0.054 0.012
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.028 0.023 0.026
Table 4.6: Crowding-In (Within-person). Probit estimates, marginal effects evaluated at
the mean with standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether
the respondent’s willingness to work is higher when offered a payment of either 100 Euro, or 500
Euro, or 1000 Euro (per week). The remaining variables as well as the omitted category are
defined as in Table 4.5.
and is zero otherwise. The dummy “intrinsic” is defined analogously. The base category is
the group of “neutral” respondents, i.e., respondents to whom both extrinsic and intrinsic
sources of motivation are of equal importance. The results of the labor supply regression
are shown in Table 4.5. We see that the extrinsic dummy is positive and highly significant
(p < 0.01) in the 1000 Euro regression, whereas it is not significant in the regressions for
the lower payment levels. In contrast, the intrinsic dummy is negative and significant in
the 500 Euro regressions (p < 0.05). Thus, the proxy that is obtained by using intra-person
ratings of the relative importance given to extrinsic vs. intrinsic factors is only partially
successful in explaining the variation in labor supply in our data.
As a second robustness check we investigate the occurrence of crowding-in analogously
to our earlier analysis. To that aim we estimate a probit model with a crowding-in dummy
88 4. WHO REACTS TO MONETARY INCENTIVES?
as the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 4.6. The specification is
analogous to the earlier specifications, with the only difference that the original proxies
are again replaced by dummies that indicate which motivational factor is more important
for the respondent. As before, the reference group are the participants to whom both
factors are of equal importance. The results confirm our earlier findings. For almost all
of the 500 Euro and 1000 Euro regressions, the extrinsic proxy is positive and significant,
whereas the intrinsic proxy is negative and significant. Moreover, the definition of our
within-person measure allows a straightforward interpretation: among people to whom
the extrinsic factor is more important, a payment of 500 Euro increases the probability
of crowding-in by 11.6%-points (p < 0.10), compared to the reference group. In contrast,
among those persons to whom the intrinsic factor is more important, the probability
of crowding-in is decreased by about 8.4%-points (p < 0.05). These effects are quite
sizeable, as the occurrence of crowding-in is 25.0% in the reference group of people to
whom both factors are of equal importance. For the 1000 Euro payment we find similar
effects: the probability of crowding-in among people to whom the extrinsic factor is more
important is increased by 15.8%-points (p < 0.05), whereas it is reduced by 7.8%-points
(p < 0.10) among those who put greater weight on the intrinsic factor. As a comparison,
the occurrence of crowding-in is 33.6% in the reference group. We therefore conclude that
our results are by and large robust to using a within-person measure of motivation.
4.5. Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the effect of monetary incentives on public-spirited
behavior by analyzing a data set that contains the labor supply decisions of volunteer
workers. We have shown that a large share of volunteers acts in line with standard eco-
nomic theory, as the prevalence of crowding-out of labor supply due to financial incentives
is relatively low. Furthermore, our results indicate that the impact of financial payments
on labor supply depends crucially on the behavioral motives of the volunteers. In our set-
ting, intrinsically motivated people are mostly unaffected by monetary incentives. They
keep their work load unchanged, even in face of high monetary incentives. This is in con-
trast to people who are extrinsically motivated and who will respond even to low stake
financial incentives by supplying more labor than before.
Our results suggest that the introduction of financial incentives leads to a change in
the composition of persons who engage in prosocial behavior. In particular, the intro-
duction of rewards may lead to a disproportionate crowding-in of extrinsically motivated
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workers. From a public policy perspective it therefore seems important to decide whether
the resulting sorting effects are desirable. Depending on the particular charitable activity,
a policy maker might want to avoid having a high share of extrinsically motivated persons.
If, on the other hand, the sorting effects are not problematic, our results have straight-
forward implications for the targeting of financial incentives to specific groups: we have
shown that intrinsically motivated workers keep their work load unchanged, even if they
are offered relatively large amounts of money. Thus, a cost-effective way to offer finan-
cial incentives would be achieved through a careful targeting towards more extrinsically
motivated people.

APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter 1
91
9
2
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
9
3
9
4
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
9
5
9
6
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
9
7
9
8
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
9
9
1
0
0
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
1
0
1
1
0
2
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
1
0
3
1
0
4
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
1
0
5
1
0
6
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
1
APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 2
107
1
0
8
B
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
T
O
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
2
Table B.1: Probability Judgment - Detailed Descriptive Statistics
[0%,20%] (20%,40%] (40%,60%] (60%,80%) 80% (80%,100%] Don’t know Total
All 205 (20.7%) 58 (5.9%) 149 (15.1%) 56 (5.7%) 239 (24.2%) 152 (15.4%) 129 (13.1%) 988 (100%)
Female 117 (22.0%) 31 (5.8%) 71 (13.3%) 29 (5.5%) 116 (21.8%) 85 (16.0%) 83 (15.6%) 532 (100%)
Male 88 (19.3%) 27 (5.9%) 78 (17.1%) 27 (5.9%) 123 (27.0%) 67 (14.7%) 46 (10.1%) 456 (100%)
Age < 50 107 (19.3%) 27 (4.9%) 82 (14.8%) 35 (6.3%) 158 (28.5%) 98 (17.7%) 47 (8.5%) 554 (100%)
Age ≥ 50 98 (22.6%) 31 (7.1%) 67 (15.4%) 21 (4.8%) 81 (18.7%) 54 (12.4%) 82 (18.9%) 434 (100%)
Word fluency measure > 0 114 (20.2%) 26 (4.6%) 80 (14.2%) 31 (5.5%) 151 (26.7%) 94 (16.6%) 69 (12.2%) 565 (100.0%)
Word fluency measure ≤ 0 91 (21.5%) 32 (7.6%) 69 (16.3%) 25 (5.9%) 88 (20.8%) 58 (13.7%) 60 (14.2%) 423 (100.0%)
Perceptual speed measure > 0 112 (19.8%) 24 (4.2%) 76 (13.5%) 40 (7.1%) 148 (26.2%) 96 (17.0%) 69 (12.2%) 565 (100.0%)
Perceptual speed measure ≤ 0 93 (22.0%) 34 (8.0%) 73 (17.3%) 16 (3.8%) 91 (21.5%) 56 (13.2%) 60 (14.2%) 423 (100.0%)
Years of schooling > 10 68 (21.0%) 16 (4.9%) 37 (11.4%) 23 (7.1%) 102 (31.5%) 51 (15.7%) 27 (8.3%) 324 (100%)
Years of schooling ≤ 10 137 (20.6%) 42 (6.3%) 112 (16.9%) 33 (5.0%) 137 (20.6%) 101 (15.2%) 102 (15.4%) 664 (100%)
University degree 30 (25.9%) 3 (2.6%) 11 (9.5%) 9 (7.8%) 44 (37.9%) 12 (10.3%) 7 (6.0%) 116 (100%)
No univ. degree 175 (20.1%) 55 (6.3%) 138 (15.8%) 47 (5.4%) 195 (22.4%) 140 (16.1%) 122 (14.0%) 872 (100%)
Table B.1: Probability Judgment - Detailed Descriptive Statistics. Bayesian answer is located in (20%,40%], base rate neglect leads to 80%,
pure base rate is in [0%,20%]. Cognitive ability measures are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
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Table B.2: Detailed Multinomial Analysis (I)
Dependent variable: answer in %, base category is x=80% (base rate neglect)
[0%,20%] (20%,40%] (40%,60%] (60%,80%) (80%,100%]
Don’t
know
Word fluency -0.219** -0.304 -0.110 -0.301* -0.042 -0.482***
measure [0.109] [0.193] [0.120] [0.167] [0.116] [0.149]
1 if female 0.441** 0.294 0.033 0.146 0.285 0.667**
[0.210] [0.351] [0.230] [0.326] [0.229] [0.270]
Age 0.010 0.008 0.006 -0.013 -0.006 0.025***
[0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008]
Years of -0.036 -0.388*** -0.199*** 0.130 -0.089 -0.196**
schooling [0.058] [0.109] [0.068] [0.084] [0.066] [0.080]
Constant -0.498 1.733 1.266 -2.378** 0.553 -0.524
[0.734] [1.231] [0.827] [1.075] [0.814] [0.986]
N. Obs. 802
Prob χ2 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.032
Table B.2: Detailed Multinomial Analysis (I). Multinomial logit estimates, reference
category is base rate neglect (x = 80%). Word fluency measure is standardized to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *,
respectively.
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Table B.3: Detailed Multinomial Analysis (II)
Dependent variable: answer in %, base category is x=80% (base rate neglect)
[0%,20%] (20%,40%] (40%,60%] (60%,80%) (80%,100%]
Don’t
know
Perceptual speed -0.189 -0.424** -0.277** -0.130 -0.083 -0.313**
measure [0.124] [0.194] [0.135] [0.185] [0.134] [0.160]
1 if female 0.326 0.229 -0.049 0.206 0.233 0.706***
[0.204] [0.328] [0.226] [0.309] [0.220] [0.271]
Age 0.008 0.003 -0.000 -0.008 -0.008 0.019**
[0.007] [0.011] [0.008] [0.011] [0.008] [0.009]
Years of -0.062 -0.396*** -0.202*** 0.070 -0.089 -0.241***
schooling [0.056] [0.101] [0.066] [0.081] [0.062] [0.081]
Constant -0.058 2.145* 1.611** -1.909* 0.731 0.149
[0.720] [1.155] [0.805] [1.052] [0.779] [1.000]
N. Obs. 850
Prob χ2 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.028
Table B.3: Detailed Multinomial Analysis (II). Multinomial logit estimates, reference
category is base rate neglect (x = 80%). Perceptual speed measure is standardized to have mean
0 and standard deviation 1. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and
*, respectively.
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Table B.4: Detailed Multinomial Analysis (III)
Dependent variable: answer in %, base category is x=80% (base rate neglect)
[0%,20%] (20%,40%] (40%,60%] (60%,80%) (80%,100%]
Don’t
know
Word fluency -0.244** -0.488*** -0.135 -0.248 -0.043 -0.457***
measure [0.108] [0.177] [0.116] [0.164] [0.113] [0.144]
1 if female 0.435** 0.243 0.008 0.069 0.285 0.559**
[0.210] [0.323] [0.224] [0.318] [0.224] [0.261]
Age 0.011* 0.004 0.011* -0.014 -0.003 0.030***
[0.006] [0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007]
1 if university degree -0.226 -1.070* -1.248*** 0.210 -0.938** -1.361***
[0.285] [0.630] [0.411] [0.423] [0.379] [0.503]
Constant -0.882*** -1.713*** -0.860*** -0.934** -0.400 -2.537***
[0.315] [0.471] [0.335] [0.453] [0.329] [0.422]
N. Obs. 843
Prob χ2 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.029
Table B.4: Detailed Multinomial Analysis (III). Multinomial logit estimates, reference
category is base rate neglect (x = 80%). Word fluency test measures cognitive pragmatics.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table B.5: Detailed Multinomial Analysis (IV)
Dependent variable: answer in %, base category is x=80% (base rate neglect)
[0%,20%] (20%,40%] (40%,60%] (60%,80%) (80%,100%]
Don’t
know
Perceptual speed -0.189 -0.616*** -0.251** -0.046 -0.013 -0.312**
measure [0.119] [0.170] [0.128] [0.179] [0.129] [0.151]
1 if female 0.347* 0.170 -0.058 0.162 0.259 0.599**
[0.200] [0.305] [0.220] [0.301] [0.216] [0.260]
Age 0.009 -0.003 0.006 -0.007 -0.003 0.025***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008]
1 if university degree -0.325 -1.307** -1.214*** -0.144 -1.018*** -1.478***
[0.271] [0.624] [0.389] [0.410] [0.360] [0.497]
Constant -0.753** -1.273*** -0.594 -1.171** -0.330 -2.330***
[0.342] [0.485] [0.363] [0.502] [0.360] [0.457]
N. Obs. 894
Prob χ2 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.027
Table B.5: Detailed Multinomial Analysis (IV). Multinomial logit estimates. Reference
category is base rate neglect (x = 80%). Perceptual speed test measures cognitive mechanics.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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C.1. Instructions for Laboratory Experiment
Welcome to today’s decision experiment.
To start, please read these instructions carefully. At the end of the instructions you
will find some example questions. The experiment starts as soon as all participants have
answered these questions correctly.
Please note that it is not allowed to communicate with other participants of the ex-
periment from now on. If this should happen, the experiment loses its scientific value and
we have to stop the experiment. If you have any questions, please hold your hand out of
the cubicle; we will then come to you.
The experiment consists of two parts. They will be called work phase and shopping
phase. During the work phase you have the possibility to earn talers. You can then use
these talers for shopping during the shopping phase. The value your purchases have for
you will be denoted in points during the experiment. Directly after the experiment, the
points you achieved will be summed up and paid in cash to you according to an exchange
rate of
1 point = 0.01 Euro
In addition, you receive 2.50 Euro for having showed up on time. The 2.50 Euro will
be paid after the experiment independently of your decisions and additionally to the
amount you earn during the experiment.
Work phase
During the work phase you have the opportunity to earn 100 talers. The work consists
of counting the number of zeros in tables filled with zeros and ones. Below, you see an
example table with 3 rows and 8 columns. The tables used in the experiment are larger,
they contain 10 rows and 30 columns.
Example of work phase
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1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
You earn the 100 talers if you succeed in finding the correct number of zeros in four
tables within 15 minutes. If you do not succeed in finding the correct number of zeros in
four tables you earn 10 talers instead.
Work phase screen
During the work phase, you will receive eight sheets with zeros and ones. Please begin
on sheet 1 and count the number of zeros on this sheet. Enter the number of zeros in the
input box in the middle of the computer screen. After entering the number click on the
OK-button. If you entered the correct number, you may continue with sheet 2. If you
entered a number that is higher by 1 or lower by 1 than the correct number, your number
will also be rated as correct. If you enter a number that deviates by more than plus/minus
1 from the correct number, your input will be rated as false. You then have another two
tries to enter the correct number for this sheet. Thus, you have three tries in total for
each sheet. In the top-right hand corner of the screen, you can see the remaining time in
seconds. The time starts at 900 seconds = 15 minutes and counts backwards.
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Please note: the red number above the OK-button indicates the number of the
current sheet. If you enter three times a wrong number for a sheet, the counter for the
current sheet changes to the next sheet. If this occurs, please put the current sheet aside
and start the next one.
You have a total of eight sheets at your disposal. As soon as you found the correct
number of zeros on four sheets, the task is completed successfully and you receive 100
talers. You then have finished the work phase. If you do not succeed in completing
the task within 15 minutes, you earn 10 talers instead.
Please note: Experience shows that is helpful to mark the 50th, 100th... counted
zero. If you miscount in this case you do not have to start all over again but you can
continue from the last marked zero.
Shopping phase
The shopping phase starts as soon as it has been determined for every participant if he
or she completed the task of the work phase successfully. You will make two shopping
decisions. Your credit balance is split equally between the two decisions. If you completed
the task of the work phase successfully you have 100/2 = 50 talers at your disposal per
purchasing decision, otherwise you have 10/2 = 5 talers.
During the shopping phase you can spend your money on two things that will be called
housing and clothing. You decide which amount of housing and clothing you want to
buy. Expenses for housing denote the rent of the apartment.
The value housing and clothing have for you are expressed in points that are exchanged
into Euro at the end of the experiment and paid out to you. How valuable a specific amount
of housing or clothing is for you is denoted in two tables during the experiment. Below you
see an example. In this example numbers of points and prices take on different values
than in the experiment. The sole purpose of this example is to help you become familiar
with the procedure of the purchasing decision.
Example of shopping phase
Housing Clothing
Units Points Units Points Your credit balance
0 0 0 0 20 talers
1 6 1 16
2 11 2 24 Prices per unit
3 15 3 27 Housing: 4 talers
4 18 4 29 Clothing: 3 talers
5 20 5 30
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In the left column of each table, the different amounts that are offered for sale are
presented. The right column indicates how many points you get for the purchase of the
corresponding amount. You can read from the table “Housing” that in this example 0 units
of housing have a value of 0 points for you, 1 unit of housing has a value of 6 points, 2 units
11 points, and so on.
Your credit balance for the purchase is indicated in the top-right panel; in this example
20 talers. In the bottom-right panel you find the prices (in talers) for housing and clothing;
prices are per unit. The prices for housing and clothing are different. The table “Prices
per unit” shows that in this example a unit of housing costs 4 talers while clothing costs
3 talers per unit.
In the purchasing decision, you decide how many units of housing and how
many units of clothing you want to buy. You can choose freely how many units to
buy as long as the total price does not exceed your credit balance.
The total price of your purchase is calculated as follows:
Total price of purchase = (units of housing × price per unit of housing)
+ (units of clothing × price per unit of clothing)
As soon as you have decided how many units of housing and how many units of clothing
to buy, it is determined how many points you will get for this decision. If you do not spend
your entire credit balance, the talers not spent are forfeited. Additionally, talers from
the first purchasing decision cannot be kept for the second purchasing decision.
The total number of points is calculated as follows:
Total number of points = points for purchased units of housing
+ points for purchased units of clothing
Example of a purchase
In the example mentioned above, you have a credit balance of
20 talers. Imagine you wanted to buy 3 units of housing and 2 units
of clothing. Then you have to pay [(3 × price per unit of housing) +
(2 × price per unit of clothing)] talers, i.e., 12 + 6 = 18 talers. This
purchase is possible with your credit balance.
In the tables, you find the number of points you get for this purchase.
You get 15 points for 3 units of housing and 24 points for 2 units
of clothing. Your purchase would thus earn you 15+24 = 39 points
Please note: It is only possible to buy one amount of each good. For example, if
you want to buy altogether 4 units of clothing, the point value that is noted next to the
number 4 (29 points) matters for you. You cannot buy first one unit of clothing and then
another 3 units of clothing, for example.
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On the computer, you make your decisions on the input screen of the shopping phase.
Below you see a screen shot of this input screen. The screen contains all information that
you need for your decision: tables for the point values of housing and clothing, your credit
balance and the prices per unit. The actual point values and prices used in the experiment
have been replaced with “XXX”.
Shopping phase screen
In the bottom-right hand corner of the screen, you can see two input fields. After
having decided how many units of housing and of clothing to buy you enter your decision
in these two fields and confirm your choice by clicking on the OK-button. After having
clicked on the OK-button you cannot change your decision anymore. Your
decision will be shown again on the screen. Please write your decision on the decision sheet
that was handed out with these instructions. If you click on the OK-button although you
would spend more talers than you have at your disposal, an error message is displayed
and you have the possibility to correct your decision.
If you have any questions please hold your hand out of the cubicle; we will then come
to you.
When all participants have answered the example questions correctly, the experiment
starts with the working phase. When all participants have finished the working phase, you
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will be presented again short instructions for the first purchasing decision on the computer
screen. Also for the second purchasing decision, the screen will show short instructions.
As soon as all participants have taken the second purchasing decision the computer screen
shows a questionnaire. After the questionnaire, the experiment is over.
Please answer the example questions handed out with these instructions before the
experiment starts.
On-screen Instructions
Before the Working Phase. The working phase is about to start now. If you
succeed in counting the correct number of zeros on four sheets within 15 minutes, you
have completed the task successfully and you get 100 talers. If you do not succeed in
completing the task successfully you get 10 talers instead.
Please click on the OK-button to start the working phase.
Before the First Purchasing Decision. You completed the task successfully.
Your credit balance per purchasing decision is thus 50 talers.
In the following shopping phase you will make two purchasing decisions.
You decide how many units of housing and how many units of clothing to buy. You
can read from the tables on the screen how many points you will get for your decision. If
you do not spend all your credit balance, the talers not spent will be forfeited.
Before the Second Purchasing Decision. Label treatment
For the second purchasing decision, you get a housing subsidy of 30 talers in
addition to your credit balance of 50 talers. You can spend the housing subsidy only on
housing.
If the amount you spend on housing is lower than the amount of the housing subsidy,
i.e., lower than 30 talers, the part of the subsidy that is not spent is forfeited.
The housing subsidy is the only difference compared to the first purchasing deci-
sion. All prices and point values remain the same.
Please note: When entering your purchasing decision, please report the total number
of units you buy, no matter whether you paid them out of your own credit balance or
out of the housing subsidy.
Cash treatment
For the second purchasing decision, you get a subsidy of 30 talers in addition to
your credit balance of 50 talers. You can spend the subsidy on housing, on clothing or on
both.
ON-SCREEN INSTRUCTIONS 119
If you do not spend the whole subsidy, the part of it that is not spent is forfeited.
The subsidy is the only difference compared to the first purchasing decision. All
prices and point values remain the same.
Please note: When entering your purchasing decision, please report the total number
of units you buy, no matter whether you paid them out of your own credit balance or
out of the subsidy.
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Moral Obligation Scenarios
Student-Support Scenario.
Mr Smith is a first-year Biology student who wants to apply for Bafo¨g.1
When he reads up on Bafo¨g he notices that he has to specify the income
of his parents and additionally his own wealth. He recently received part
of his bequest, amounting to 32 000 Euro. If he declares this amount
his application will be rejected. He decides to not declare the bequest
in his application in order to receive Bafo¨g anyway.
What do you think about the behavior of Mr Smith? 1: “Not justified at all”, 6: “Fully
justified”
Unemployment-Benefit Scenario.
Ms Newman has finished her studies of Law and is looking for a job. She
has already found one but this position is only available in three months.
She knows that she is eligible for unemployment benefit. She could easily
bridge the time until the job starts since she has savings of 10 000 Euro.
Additionally, her parents support her with 800 Euro per month until the
new job starts. Ms Newman decides to claim unemployment benefit in
addition, amounting to 300 Euro per month.
What do you think about the behavior of Ms Newman? 1: “Not justified at all”, 6: “Fully
justified”
C.2. Wording of Vignette Survey
Hello!
We are conducting a survey as part of our doctoral research. Please imagine to be in the
following situation and answer the two questions.
Suppose you have finished your studies and are about to start postgraduate studies in
a new city. The university provides you with a monthly scholarship of 900 Euro. This
is your only income. You have decided to live on your own. You find two apartments
between which you can choose. Both are in the same building and are of similar standard.
Apartment A has 25 sqm and the rent is 250 Euro per month. Apartment B has 37 sqm
1“Bafo¨g” is the student support provided by the state in Germany. The amount depends on own
income, own wealth and parents’ income.
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and the rent is 410 Euro per month. Which apartment would you rather choose in the
financial situation described above?
 Apartment A  Apartment B
[Cash treatment] : Now suppose that the city administration provides you with a monthly
scholarship of 200 Euro, in addition to your university scholarship of 900 Euro. Which
apartment would you rather choose in this new situation?
[Label treatment] : Now suppose that the city administration provides you with a monthly
housing subsidy of 200 Euro, in addition to your university scholarship of 900 Euro. This
housing subsidy has to be spent exclusively on rent expenditures. Which apartment would
you rather choose in this new situation?
 Apartment A  Apartment B
Field of Study: ..............................
Age: .......
 Female  Male
Thank you!
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